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ABSTRACT 
The past five years have witnessed a surge of interdisciplinary research aimed at understanding 
and improving consumer financial decision making. Scholars in this area attempt to enhance 
consumer welfare by uncovering and altering situational and contextual factors that drive 
individuals to make financially suboptimal decisions. Naturally, most research in this nascent 
field has focused on how individuals approach financial decisions. However, financial decisions 
are often subject to social influence and are made within the context of existing relationships 
(e.g., between spouses). Moreover, the outcomes of such decisions can be important 
determinants of relationship satisfaction. Thus, my dissertation provides a more complete 
understanding of consumer financial decision making by examining how financial decisions 
influence the development of relationships (Essay 1) and how relationship dynamics influence 
financial decisions (Essay 2). I find that others’ chronic spending habits shape the inferences we 
draw about them (e.g., their perceived general self-control), which ultimately influences initial 
romantic and physical attraction. I also find that couples make more optimal debt repayment 
decisions working together than individual couple members working on their own. Unlike 
stranger-pairs who lack information about each other’s relative strengths and weaknesses, 
established couples benefit from placing greater weight on the preferences of the partner with 
greater financial expertise. Theoretical implications and future directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER I  
Introduction 
 
The very first issue of the Journal of Consumer Research begins with an article entitled 
“Psychology and Consumer Economics” (Katona 1974). The author calls for greater integration 
between the two fields because consumers’ spending and saving are directly impacted by various 
economic conditions (e.g., inflation, recession). The first issue also contains papers covering how 
marital roles influence money management (Ferber and Lee 1974), the consumption decision 
process (i.e., problem recognition, information search, and final decision; Davis and Rigaux 
1974), and the effect of information disclosure on credit usage (Day and Brandt 1974). What 
these four articles have in common is an emphasis on consumers’ financial decisions. Thus, 
researchers have been examining topics relevant to consumer financial decision making (CFDM) 
since the inception of one of our premier journals 40 years ago.  
Yet, it has only been in recent years that CFDM has risen to the forefront. A special 
interdisciplinary issue of the Journal of Marketing Research in 2011 on consumer finance (the 
first special issue in several decades) stimulated additional research among marketing scholars. 
A central goal of CFDM is to enhance consumer welfare by uncovering and altering situational 
and contextual factors that drive individuals to make financially suboptimal decisions. Common 
characteristics of CFDM research include representative sampling methods (e.g., less reliance on 
undergraduate participants), incentive-compatible designs, and field studies/experiments. Since 
the 2011 special issue, numerous articles have been published in the consumer behavior and 
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marketing literatures. For example, recent work has focused on debt management and investment 
decisions (e.g., Besharat, Varki, and Craig 2015; Duclos 2015; Gal and McShane 2012; 
Hershfield and Roese 2015), consumer spending behavior (e.g., Bartels and Urminsky 2015; 
Rick, Pereira, and Burson 2014; Sharma and Alter 2012; Sussman and Alter 2012), and financial 
expertise (e.g., Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer 2014; Hadar, Sood, and Fox 2013).  
Most research in this nascent field has concentrated on how individuals approach 
financial decisions. However, many important financial decisions are subject to social influence 
and are made within the context of existing relationships (e.g., spouses deciding whether to pay 
off their car loan or make an extra mortgage payment; Gorlin and Dhar 2012; Simpson, 
Griskevicius, and Rothman 2012). For instance, a longitudinal study of newlyweds found that 
“the most frequent family financial officer…was the couple acting jointly” (Ferber and Lee 
1974, 45). More recently, Pew Research (2008) estimates that 46% of couples jointly make large 
purchase decisions for the home. Therefore, focusing only on individual-level financial decision 
making paints an incomplete and unrealistic picture for many consumers.   
The goal of my dissertation is to shed light on the intersection between social influence 
and the emerging area of CFDM. Specifically, I examine how financial decisions influence the 
development of romantic relationships (Essay 1) and how relationship dynamics influence 
financial decisions (Essay 2). I focus on romantic relationships because saving and spending 
decisions are more relevant to romantic relationships than to other types of interpersonal 
relationships. Friends, for example, do not merge finances. By contrast, romantic partners 
frequently merge their assets and debts, which have direct implications for economic and 
psychological well-being (Dew 2007, 2008, 2011). Moreover, an abundance of prior research 
identifies finances as a common source of friction within romantic relationships (e.g., Amato and 
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Rogers 1997; Dew, Britt, and Huston 2012; Papp, Cummings, and Goeke-Morey 2009; Rick, 
Small, and Finkel 2011). Given this prior research, beginning with a focus on romantic 
relationships (vs. other types of unions) is warranted. The next section provides a brief outline of 
the chapters that follow. 
 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 
A Penny Saved is a Partner Earned: The Romantic Appeal of Savers 
 
My first essay investigates how an individual’s saving and spending habits impact his or 
her attractiveness in the eyes of potential mates. Prior work suggests that people (men, in 
particular) are more likely to spend lavishly when desiring a romantic partner as a way to signal 
access to financial resources (Griskevicius et al. 2007; Sundie et al. 2011). However, it is unclear 
whether spending money actually helps to attract mates. One could argue that habitual spending 
may be viewed as wasteful and lead to disagreements that weaken the relationship (e.g., 
arguments over money are a strong predictor of divorce; Dew et al. 2012). Thus, contrary to the 
widespread intuition that spending enhances romantic appeal, I propose that “savers” are likely 
to be more desirable than “spenders” as prospective partners.   
Unlike their more impulsive counterparts, savers are likely to benefit from perceptions of 
greater general self-control. Although some people enjoy saving and find it effortless, for others, 
saving requires actively suppressing the urge to spend. Individuals who possess self-control are 
likely to be desirable for a number of reasons: they are less likely to say hurtful things, cheat, 
and/or divert us from our own goals that require restraint (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 
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2004; Vohs, Finkenauer, and Baumeister 2011). Because savers are perceived as exercising self-
control with their finances, they may also be assumed to exercise self-control in other domains 
(e.g., eating nutritious foods, exercising regularly; cf. de Ridder et al. 2012; Tangney et al. 2004).  
 My first experiment uses a mock dating game to examine whether savers are preferred to 
spenders as dating partners. Participants interacted with two prospective mates in a face-to-face 
context, with the goal of ultimately choosing one of the individuals for a potential date. As 
predicted, individuals preferred to date the person who described themselves as a saver rather 
than the person who described themselves as a spender. Subsequent experiments featured mock 
dating profiles where targets revealed their spending habits, a common practice on dating 
websites (e.g., eHarmony users indicate their level of frugality when creating profiles; Lieber 
2010). Regardless of how spending habits were described (e.g., “I love saving money” or “I hate 
spending money”), I find a robust romantic preference for savers over spenders (as well as over 
“control” targets who do not describe their feelings toward money), among both men and 
women. Savers are viewed as possessing greater general self-control than spenders, and perceived 
self-control increases savers’ romantic appeal. Potential alternative sources of savers’ appeal (i.e., 
current and anticipated financial viability, reduced materialism) are also examined, but general 
self-control is found to be the dominant mechanism. In addition, savers are expected to take better 
care of themselves, and this expectation favorably biases perceptions of savers’ physical 
attractiveness. However, savers do not benefit from an indiscriminate positive halo: they are also 
viewed as less exciting than spenders. Traits (e.g., boredom susceptibility; Zuckerman 1979, 
1994) and states (e.g., boredom inductions) that increase the desire for stimulation decrease the 
preference for savers. Finally, I establish—in a face-to-face, incentive-compatible study—that 
people can accurately distinguish between savers and spenders simply by glancing at them. This 
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is an important demonstration because the inferential process I propose (i.e., that people draw 
inferences from a target’s spending habits, which ultimately influences attraction) is only relevant 
outside of the lab if people can spontaneously distinguish between savers and spenders. I find 
this to be the case. Thus, my work elucidates how a fundamental consumption behavior (i.e., 
one’s tendency to spend or save) is perceived and is influential in romantic relationship formation.  
 
Managing Debt and Managing Each Other: The Interpersonal Dynamics of Shared Financial 
Decisions  
 
My first essay focuses on the relational benefits of being a saver, but not everyone saves 
money judiciously. Oftentimes, poor money management decisions can land someone in serious 
debt. Recent work has begun investigating how individuals navigate debt repayment decisions 
(e.g., Amar et al. 2011; Besharat et al. 2015; Brown and Lahey 2014; Gal and McShane 2012; 
Hershfield and Roese 2015; Kettle et al. 2015; Navarro-Martinez et al. 2011; Stewart 2009), but 
when debt is jointly held, such decisions often invite input from all indebted parties. 
When individuals are faced with multiple debts varying in amounts and interest rates, 
they tend to repay the smallest debt first rather than the debt with the highest interest rate (Amar 
et al. 2011), a costly tendency known as debt account aversion (DAA). Several psychological 
factors contribute to DAA, including the temptation of pursuing goals nearest completion and the 
pleasure of eliminating an obligation. However, whether DAA would persist in a joint decision 
making context is unclear. There are at least two reasons to expect that couples might be less 
susceptible to DAA: a greater likelihood of identifying the optimal repayment strategy through 
deliberation (“two heads are better than one”), and an ability to identify and empower the partner 
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with greater financial competence. Prior research on transactive memory within romantic 
relationships indicates that couples develop a shared system for information management such 
that each partner takes charge of only a portion of total information (e.g., Wegner, Erber, and 
Raymond 1991; Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel 1985). These systems allow partners to effectively 
offload task responsibility to the partner with greater competence in a given domain. 
My second essay, therefore, examines the influence of an interpersonal context on debt 
management decisions. I conducted a series of incentive-compatible experiments in which 
people were randomly assigned to complete a debt management game individually or in pairs. In 
the game (Amar et al. 2011), participants are initially saddled with six debts varying in size and 
interest rate. Critically, larger debts tend to have larger interest rates, meaning that participants 
must avoid closing small debts to perform well. The game lasts 25 “years” (rounds), and 
participants receive annual salaries they must use to repay one or more debts. I find that couple 
members working together are less susceptible to DAA than couple members working on their 
own. I then examined the performance of pairs of strangers to assess the viability of the 
transactive memory account. Strangers should benefit similarly from deliberation, but may be 
less likely to recognize and empower the partner with greater competence. Indeed, stranger-pairs 
performed significantly worse than individuals, suggesting that inferred financial competence 
plays a crucial role within couples. A final experiment examined the effectiveness of a brief 
“warm up” exercise designed to improve the ability of partners to infer one another’s financial 
competence, and thus more effectively navigate subsequent debt repayment decisions.
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CHAPTER II 
A Penny Saved is a Partner Earned: The Romantic Appeal of Savers 
 
What we consume conveys information about who we are (Belk 1988; Berger and Heath 
2007). For example, prior research suggests that variety-seeking signals open-mindedness 
(Ratner and Kahn 2002), product size preferences signal status (Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 
2012), and nonconformity signals competence (Bellezza, Gino, and Keinan 2014). In romantic 
contexts, men who are motivated to find a mate are especially likely to buy luxury goods to 
signal their wealth (Griskevicius et al. 2007). This tendency echoes recent advice from the Wall 
Street Journal to (essentially) “burn a big pile of money on the first date,” as a signal of wealth 
(Oyer 2014). In fact, one prior experiment (Sundie et al. 2011, study 4) suggests that when 
women only have information about a single purchase, they tend to view men who recently 
purchased a luxury good (a new Porsche Boxster) as more attractive dating partners than men 
who recently purchased a more basic good (a new Honda Civic). Buying the Porsche may have 
increased men’s dating desirability by signaling financial viability to women, though this was not 
measured directly.  
Although an episode of lavish spending may be more effective than an episode of 
conservative spending at attracting potential mates in the short-term, in this paper we consider 
whether a chronically high propensity to spend money is generally more effective than a 
chronically high propensity to save money at attracting mates. In other words, are “spenders” 
initially more attractive than “savers” as potential romantic partners? We propose that 
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individuals’ general financial tendencies influence the inferences others draw about them, and 
thus their initial romantic appeal. 
The terms “saver” and “spender” are commonly used in everyday conversation and in the 
academic literature. For example, in a macroeconomic model of fiscal policy, Mankiw (2000, 
122) characterized “savers” as people who amass wealth that can stay within the family for 
generations, and “spenders” as people who “consume their entire after-tax labor income in every 
period.” Along similar (though less extreme) lines, we propose a behavioral distinction between 
savers and spenders: savers have a low “marginal propensity to consume” (MPC) whereas 
spenders have a high MPC.
1
 The MPC is a common measure in the economics literature that 
captures the proportion of an increase in income that is spent as opposed to saved. For example, 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) measured MPC by asking participants to imagine that they recently 
received a bonus at work and to report how much extra they now planned to spend per month. 
Recent work indicates that people differ widely in their MPC (Jappelli and Pistaferri 2013), 
suggesting that responses to these types of questions provide a meaningful distinction among 
consumers. There may be many psychological motives behind having a low or high MPC (i.e., 
being a “saver” or a “spender”), and indeed ambiguity about the cause(s) of one’s general 
tendency to save or spend is likely necessary to produce effects on romantic attraction, as we 
discuss shortly. 
We focus on romantic appeal in particular, rather than more general appeal (e.g., as a 
friend), to build directly upon prior research that has examined the link between spending and 
romantic relationships (e.g., Griskevicius et al. 2007; Sundie et al. 2011). In addition, saving and 
spending habits are more relevant to romantic relationships than to other types of interpersonal 
                                                          
1
 We refer to individuals as “savers” and “spenders” instead of low-spenders and high-spenders because “income 
must be spent or saved… what is not spent is, by definition, saved, and constitutes savings” (Webley 2014, 244). 
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relationships. Friends, for example, do not merge finances. By contrast, saving and spending 
habits are a common source of friction in romantic relationships (e.g., Amato and Rogers 1997).  
Rick, Small, and Finkel (2011) addressed a related question, namely whether differences 
between typical and desired spending habits predict who marries whom. They found that 
tightwads (who typically spend less than they would ideally like to spend) tend to marry 
spendthrifts (who typically spend more than they would ideally like to spend), a rare instance in 
which opposites attract. However, this study did not focus on initial attraction: marriages 
represent only a small subset of romantic relationships (i.e., breaking up is more common than 
getting married). Moreover, this research did not address saving and spending per se. Tightwads 
and savers are not equivalent: tightwads would like to spend more and are frustrated with how 
little they spend (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008; Rick et al. 2011), whereas savers are 
presumably not frustrated with their saving tendencies. Likewise, spendthrifts would like to 
spend less and are frustrated with how much they spend, whereas spenders may simply enjoy 
spending. The saver versus spender distinction is more likely to influence initial attraction than 
the tightwad versus spendthrift distinction, as the latter distinction requires a more difficult 
assessment (i.e., assessing both typical and desired spending habits).  
Intuitively, one’s typical spending habits might be expected to influence one’s perceived 
attractiveness by signaling information about financial resources. Simply put, people who spend 
large amounts of money may be perceived as having large amounts of money to spend. 
However, spending need not be an “honest” signal of financial resources. Credit allows people to 
spend beyond their means, and observers may question whether big spenders are actually able to 
afford the items they buy. Moreover, savers are likely perceived as more capable of amassing 
wealth over the long run. Thus, while spending versus saving behavior may not provide an 
  
10 
 
unambiguous signal of one’s financial resources, it seems likely that savers would, on average, 
be perceived as possessing greater financial resources than spenders.  
Although there are likely instances in which savers are preferred because of their 
perceived financial resources (e.g., when people are feeling financially deprived and desperate 
for money), it is worth noting that perceived financial resources are typically not top-of-mind 
when people consider their ideal romantic partner (Fletcher et al. 1999, table 1). Indeed, we 
propose that savers are more likely to benefit from positive inferences about their character than 
from positive inferences about their savings account balance. In particular, savers may be 
perceived as possessing high self-control (typically defined as an ability to override and change 
one’s natural responses to best serve one’s long-term interests; Muraven and Baumeister 2000). 
Although some people may enjoy saving and find it effortless, for many people saving requires 
overriding a temptation to spend. Indeed, interventions that weaken self-control generally 
increase spending, suggesting that self-regulatory resources are required to deter spending (Vohs 
and Faber 2007). Given this, and the tendency for observers to make dispositional inferences 
based on others’ behavior (e.g., Jones and Nisbett 1971), spending versus saving behavior is 
likely to be considered diagnostic of self-control in the financial domain.  
Beyond the financial domain, savers may be viewed as possessing high general self-
control, applicable across domains (e.g., eating, fitness, time management). Indeed, describing a 
potential mate as “wild,” “impulsive,” “detail-oriented,” or “responsible” could convey 
information about his or her level of self-control in a variety of areas. While some researchers 
have conceptualized financial self-control as a distinct construct (e.g., Haws, Bearden, and 
Nenkov 2012; Tsukayama, Duckworth, and Kim 2012), other evidence suggests that measures of 
general self-control predict behavior well across a variety of domains (Baumeister 2000; de 
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Ridder et al. 2012; Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 2004). To the extent that people have the 
intuition that self-regulatory resources are not domain-specific, but rather apply across domains, 
routine saving behavior may be viewed as diagnostic of broad self-control.  
To our knowledge, only one small-scale experiment (N = 40), by Righetti and Finkenauer 
(2011, experiment 1), has previously examined a similar question. The researchers manipulated 
whether participants read about a person (the “target”) who recently went music shopping and 
ultimately did or did not buy several new CDs. Participants judged the target who bought several 
CDs as possessing less general self-control than the person who did not buy any CDs. However, 
in both conditions, the target first mentioned that “I definitely need to save some money for my 
further education which is really important for me!” Thus, the results may have been driven by 
the perception of an explicit self-control failure in the spending condition (the target wants to 
save, but ultimately spends). It is therefore unclear whether spending, per se, reduced perceived 
self-control, or whether it was spending while pursuing a savings goal. In the current research, 
we examine how spending and saving tendencies (revealed without directly implying self-control 
failures) influence perceptions of general self-control and ultimately attractiveness. 
If savers are perceived as having greater general self-control than spenders, they may also 
be viewed as more attractive relationship partners than spenders. High self-control in a romantic 
partner may enhance relationship quality in a number of ways (e.g., by preventing partners from 
saying hurtful things or engaging in infidelity; Balliet, Li, and Joireman 2011; Pronk, Karremans, 
and Wigboldus 2011; Tangney et al. 2004; Vohs, Finkenauer, and Baumeister 2011). Self-
control also predicts how likely relationship partners are to keep the promises they make to one 
another (e.g., to do the laundry or quit smoking; Peetz and Kammrath 2011). Indeed, high self-
control seems likely to enhance the very attributes that are most valued in ideal romantic partners 
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(e.g., accommodation, kindness, commitment, trustworthiness; Finkel and Campbell 2001; 
Fletcher et al. 1999). Additionally, from an interdependence theory perspective, savers may be 
viewed as most capable of helping potential mates achieve goals that require high self-control 
(Shea, Davisson, and Fitzsimons 2013).  
  Favorable self-control perceptions may even bias perceptions of physical attractiveness. 
If savers are presumably higher in general self-control, they may be expected to take better care 
of themselves as well (e.g., adhering to a balanced diet and exercising regularly; Tangney et al. 
2004). Indeed, recent work suggests that people who are better able to save for the future are 
more likely to take steps toward improving their health when confronted with threatening health 
information (Gubler and Pierce 2014). To the extent that health and physical fitness increase 
physical attractiveness (Grammer et al. 2003), savers may also be expected to be more physically 
attractive. Thus, when physical attractiveness is at least somewhat ambiguous, observers may 
expect savers to be more physically attractive and view them through that biased lens (e.g., Srull 
and Wyer 1979). Formally, we hypothesize: 
 
H1: People will be perceived as more romantically (H1A) and physically (H1B) 
attractive when they are viewed as savers than when they are viewed as spenders.  
H2: The influence of spending habits on perceived romantic and physical attractiveness 
will be mediated by perceptions of general self-control (H2A). Perceptions of general 
self-control will be more influential than perceptions of financial viability (H2B). 
 
We focus on the role of self-control inferred from financial decisions, but it is worth 
considering whether evidence of self-control in any consumption domain would lead to greater 
perceived attractiveness. Prior work suggests that restraint in the domain of food consumption 
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may be viewed as feminine (and undesirable) in certain circumstances (e.g., men who eat lightly 
while out on a date; Wansink 2006). We anticipate that saving, by contrast, will rarely have a 
negative gendered association (i.e., saving money is not considered inherently feminine) and will 
generally portray one’s level of self-control in a positive light.  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
  
 We examine whether, why, and when savers are preferred to spenders in romantic 
contexts. Our first experiment featured a mock dating game in which participants were asked to 
choose between a saver confederate and a spender confederate for a hypothetical date. The 
purpose of this design was to establish whether individuals favor one tendency over the other 
when they are first introduced (face-to-face) to a prospective mate. Our subsequent experiments 
used online dating profiles with small modifications. Specifically, to test our hypotheses and 
control for confounding factors that may be correlated with saving versus spending habits, we 
had the same target describe themselves as a saver or a spender. (Describing your spending 
habits is common on popular dating websites such as eHarmony; Lieber 2010.) We anticipated 
that viewing online dating profiles would be a somewhat familiar context for many participants. 
For example, Pew Research reports that nearly 40% of American adults age 18 and older who 
are “single and looking” have tried online dating (Smith and Duggan 2013). This percentage is 
even higher when targeting younger age groups. When we surveyed 100 single adults between 
the ages of 18 and 35, a total of 65% reported having tried online dating.  
We sought to determine whether evidence of saving behavior enhances one’s romantic 
appeal relative to evidence of spending behavior, utilizing a number of different ways of 
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describing saving versus spending behavior (experiments 2A and 2B). Experiments 3A and 3B 
aimed to establish evidence for the underlying mechanism of self-control perceptions and test the 
viability of rival explanations (e.g., perceived financial resources). Experiment 4 examined 
whether savers are also perceived as more physically attractive than spenders (a bias driven by 
expectations of general self-control), and whether results could be attributed to a positive halo 
effect. We then examined factors that are likely to moderate the romantic appeal of savers. 
Potential mates high in general self-control likely possess a number of attractive attributes, but 
choosing such a mate may require sacrificing excitement. Consistent with this idea, experiments 
5 and 6 investigated whether traits and states that reduce the tolerance for boredom reduce the 
preference for savers over spenders.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1: ARE SAVERS PREFERRED TO SPENDERS  
AS DATING PARTNERS? 
 
 Our first experiment used a mock dating game to examine whether savers are preferred to 
spenders as dating partners. Participants interacted with two prospective mates in a face-to-face 
context, with the goal of ultimately choosing one of them for a date. Thus, experiment 1 provides 
an externally valid test of our key prediction that savers will be more desirable than spenders.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
Single, heterosexual students from a large Midwestern university (N = 73; Mage = 20; 
56% female) participated in exchange for a small payment. Participants arrived to the lab in 
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same-sex groups of no more than five and were seated in a semi-circle. Two opposite-sex 
confederates (“contestants”) were seated at the front of the room as part of our modified dating 
game. Participants were told that we were interested in understanding how individuals evaluate 
potential romantic partners given limited information. Each of the participants (“guests”) 
received a question (pulled from an opaque container) that they publicly asked the two 
contestants (see appendix 1). The first four questions were presented in a randomized order, with 
the final question serving as our key manipulation: “When it comes to money, would you say 
you’re more of a saver or more of a spender?” One of the contestants answered “more of a 
saver,” while the other contestant answered “more of a spender” (note that the contestants’ roles 
were counterbalanced across experimental sessions).  
After the contestants answered the five questions, they left the room. Participants were 
then asked to indicate in an anonymous and confidential online survey, which contestant they 
would most like to go out on a date with if we had played the game for real (1-4 scale, where 1 = 
strong preference for contestant 1, 2 = slight preference for contestant 1, 3 = slight preference 
for contestant 2, and 4 = strong preference for contestant 2). We provided images of the two 
contestants along with their names to help participants remember their identities. The follow-up 
survey also included perceived personality ratings of each contestant (i.e., approachable, 
genuine, honest, humorous, intelligent, and nice where 0 = not at all and 6 = very much) to 
examine potential mediators of dating preferences. We assured students that their responses 
would be accessible only to the researchers, not the contestants.  
Participants concluded the experiment by answering some demographic questions, 
including their own spending habits (i.e., a choice between more of a saver or more of a 
spender). Three participants were eliminated from analysis because they indicated that they 
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knew one or both of the contestants before arriving to the lab, resulting in a final sample of 70 
students (Mage = 20; 56% female). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The key dependent variable was a 1-4 scale (reflecting a slight to strong preference for 
one contestant over the other), so we collapsed the scale to represent a choice between the saver 
and spender. Participants were significantly more likely to select the self-identified saver for a 
date compared to the self-identified spender (63% vs. 37%, p < .05 sign test). Additional 
analyses indicated that date preferences did not differ by gender (χ2(1) =1.57, p = .21) or 
participant’s own status as a saver versus spender (χ2(1) < 1). The two contestants were also 
viewed similarly in terms of inferred personality traits (ps > .16 for male confederates, ps > .15 
for female confederates), suggesting that these qualities are not mediating dating preferences.  
In sum, individuals preferred to date the saver instead of the spender in a face-to-face 
context. If date choice is a proxy for romantic attraction, then these results provide initial support 
for hypothesis 1A. Subsequent experiments provide additional tests of our hypotheses by using 
an online dating paradigm in which participants are exposed to either a saver or a spender.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2A: DOES ONE’S MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO CONSUME 
INFLUENCE ONE’S ROMANTIC APPEAL? 
 
 Experiment 2A was designed to test our central hypothesis and validate the use of MPC 
as an indication of one’s saving versus spending tendencies. Specifically, we examined whether 
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people who reveal a low MPC (savers) are viewed as more romantically attractive than people 
who reveal a high MPC (spenders; hypothesis 1A). Participants viewed the online dating profile 
of a “target” who was given a standard measure of MPC (indicating how much s/he would spend 
vs. save from an unanticipated windfall; cf. Shefrin and Thaler 1988). This financial question is 
similar to those commonly asked by some dating websites (e.g., Match.com asks users “What 
would you do with an unexpected bonus?” when they create their profile). The target either 
revealed that s/he would spend a majority of the windfall or save a majority of the windfall.  
 
Participants and Procedure  
 
We recruited 100 adults aged 18-25 (Mage = 23; 34% female) via Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing platform validated by Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010). 
Participants completed the experiment in exchange for a small payment. In our experiments that 
utilized MTurk participants, we restricted the potential age range of participants because the 
“target” in our dating experiments was relatively young, as discussed below. We told participants 
that we were interested in examining perceptions of single individuals. Several single men and 
women were ostensibly interviewed, and participants were told that they would be shown a 
randomly selected interviewee (which we will refer to as the “target,” though we did not use this 
label in the experiment). Participants were asked whether they were more attracted to men or 
women, and the target matched the sex they found most attractive (typically, the opposite sex). 
The next screen featured a color image of the target male (“Andrew”) or female (“Andrea”), who 
was described as being in his or her 20s, single, and currently employed full-time (target images 
were pretested to be of average attractiveness among a separate group of individuals from the 
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study population; see appendix 2). The screen also displayed the target’s response to “one 
randomly selected question,” which served as our manipulation of MPC (i.e., “Imagine that 
you've won $1,000 in a raffle. How much of this money would you spend, and how much would 
you save?”). We manipulated the target’s response, randomly assigning participants to either the 
Low MPC condition (“I think I'd spend about $250 pretty quickly and save the rest") or the High 
MPC condition (“I think I'd spend about $750 pretty quickly and save the rest”).  
After viewing the target’s profile, participants were asked to consider the target as a 
potential romantic partner for themselves and indicate their agreement with four statements using 
1-7 scales, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree: “I would really like this person 
as a romantic partner,” “I would be interested in going on a date with this person,” “This person 
and I would probably have a real connection,” and “This person and I would be very compatible 
as romantic partners” (adapted from Eastwick, Finkel, and Eagly 2011). We averaged responses 
to these four statements to form a romantic Attractiveness index (α = .95).  
Next, to ensure that participants viewed targets with a low MPC as savers and targets 
with a high MPC as spenders, we asked participants whether they viewed the target as more of a 
spender or a saver. Specifically, we asked, “In terms of money habits, how would you describe 
the person you read about?” Participants responded on a 1-7 scale, where 1 = definitely a spender 
and 7 = definitely a saver. 
Finally, we collected demographic information including participants’ relationship status 
(i.e., partnered or not) and individual income level. These two measures did not interact with the 
target’s MPC to influence romantic attraction (ps ≥ .35) nor influence key results in any of the 
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presented experiments.
2
 We also asked participants to recall how much of the raffle winnings the 
target planned to spend (e.g., $750 of the $1,000). Six participants answered the attention check 
incorrectly and were eliminated from analyses (though in this and all subsequent experiments, 
the results do not change substantively if we include participants who answered the check 
incorrectly). Thus, the final sample consisted of 94 participants.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 1A, targets with a low MPC were rated as significantly more 
romantically attractive than targets with a high MPC (M = 5.10, SD = 1.17 vs. M = 3.75, SD = 
1.80; t(92) = 4.30, p < .001, d = .90). Because the target in both conditions began by focusing on 
how much s/he would spend, we needed to verify that targets with a low MPC were still viewed 
as savers. Indeed, targets with a low MPC were viewed as savers to a significantly greater extent 
than were targets with a high MPC (M = 5.57, SD = .86 vs. M = 2.13, SD = 1.10; t(92) = 16.81, p 
< .001, d = 3.51). Note that the low MPC mean was significantly above the scale midpoint (t(47) 
= 12.34, p < .001) and the high MPC mean was significantly below (t(47) = 11.77, p < .001). 
This result gives us greater confidence in our conceptualization of savers versus spenders. 
Overall, we find that being viewed as a saver is more likely to increase one’s romantic 
appeal than being viewed as a spender. Experiment 2B explores this phenomenon further using 
different expressions of financial habits.  
                                                          
2
 We conducted similar analyses featuring participants’ own relationship status and income level in subsequent 
experiments. Because these variables did not have significant effects on our analyses of interest, we elected not to 
pursue them in the present paper. Our central focus is on perceptions of others, but future research might explore 
intrapersonal qualities of the perceiver (note that we do examine the effect of participants’ own boredom 
susceptibility in experiment 6, but additional moderators warrant study). 
  
20 
 
EXPERIMENT 2B: DOES SAVING INCREASE ROMANTIC APPEAL OR DOES 
SPENDING DECREASE ROMANTIC APPEAL? 
 
Experiment 2B extends experiment 2A in two ways. First, we include a control condition 
in which the target did not describe his or her spending habits, to assess whether saving enhances 
romantic appeal, whether spending decreases it, or whether both are true. Second, we explore a 
variety of different ways of characterizing one’s saving versus spending habits (e.g., “I love 
saving money” vs. “I hate spending money”), which are likely more natural in everyday 
conversation than descriptions of how one would treat a windfall (as utilized in experiment 2A).   
 
Participants and Procedure  
 
 We recruited 282 adults aged 18-30 (Mage = 24; 35% female) via MTurk. In this 
experiment, we presented all participants with an opposite-sex dating profile. Participants viewed 
the same basic profile as in experiment 2A, with the same target (Andrew or Andrea), but here 
the “randomly selected question” for the target was “How would you describe your feelings 
toward spending money?” We manipulated how the target answered this question, randomly 
assigning participants to one of nine conditions. In four Saving conditions, the target responded 
“I guess people would say I’m a big saver,” “I love saving money,” “I hate spending money,” or 
“I have a hard time getting myself to spend money.” In four Spending conditions, the target 
responded “I guess people would say I’m a big spender,” “I love spending money,” “I hate 
saving money,” or “I have a hard time getting myself to save money.” In a ninth (Control) 
condition, the target did not describe his or her spending habits, instead stating “I’m not sure how 
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I would describe my spending habits.” Participants evaluated the target on the same four-item 
romantic Attractiveness index used in experiment 2A (α = .94).  
The experiment concluded with demographic questions and an attention check asking 
participants to recall the spending habits of the target. Eighteen participants (6% of the sample) 
answered the attention check incorrectly and were eliminated from analyses. Thus, the final 
sample consisted of 264 participants.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We began by examining the influence of spending habits on perceived attractiveness. An 
ANOVA revealed significant differences in attractiveness across the nine conditions (F(8, 255) = 
2.56, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .07; see figure 1). We then conducted a series of planned contrasts between 
each opposing pair of descriptions (e.g., “I love saving money” vs. “I love spending money”). 
Regardless of how spending habits were described, savers were generally viewed as more 
attractive than spenders. The one exception to this preference is the directional but nonsignificant 
difference between “I have a hard time getting myself to spend money” (M = 3.99, SD = 1.68) 
and “I have a hard time getting myself to save money” (M = 3.79, SD = 1.50; t(255) < 1). 
Presumably, “having a hard time” spending or saving may be too ambiguous a signal about one’s 
typical spending habits; indeed, those descriptions may better reflect tightwad versus spendthrift 
tendencies (Rick et al. 2008) than pure saving versus spending tendencies. However, supporting 
hypothesis 1A, when the four saving conditions were averaged together and contrasted against 
the four spending conditions, we found that savers (M = 4.29, SD = 1.64) were viewed as 
significantly more attractive than spenders (M = 3.48, SD = 1.54; t(255) = 3.95, p < .001, d = 
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.51). Also, savers were generally more attractive than the Control target, and the Control target 
was generally more attractive than spenders (see figure 1), suggesting that saving increases 
attractiveness, whereas spending decreases attractiveness.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3A: WHY ARE SAVERS VIEWED AS MORE ATTRACTIVE?  
 
Experiment 3A examined the underlying process driving the romantic preference for 
savers. We hypothesize that savers are preferred because of their greater perceived self-
regulatory resources (hypothesis 2A). Although some people may enjoy saving money and find it 
effortless, observers may assume that savers actively control impulses to spend, and thus are also 
capable of exerting self-control in other (non-financial) domains. This perception may increase 
the romantic appeal of savers. High self-control in a potential mate enhances relationship quality 
in a number of ways (e.g., by discouraging cheating and hurtful comments; Tangney et al. 2004), 
and to the extent that observers anticipate these benefits, they may desire savers on the basis of 
their perceived self-control.  
Of course, alternative explanations are plausible. For example, to the extent that spenders 
are viewed as routinely buying material goods, they may be viewed as more materialistic and 
extrinsically motivated than savers, which may reduce their interpersonal appeal (Van Boven, 
Campbell, and Gilovich 2010). Although we anticipate that perceptions of materialism are less 
central to evaluations of romantic appeal than perceptions of self-control, we also examined the 
viability of the materialism account in experiment 3A.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
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Students from a large Midwestern university (N = 128; Mage = 20; 70% female) 
participated in exchange for a small payment. We initially asked participants whether they were 
more attracted to men or women. We then presented participants with a dating profile featuring a 
target matching participants’ preferred sex. We manipulated whether the potential mate 
described themselves as a saver or a spender. In this and all subsequent experiments in which 
targets describe their spending habits, the target’s response in the saving condition was 
“Hmm…I guess people would say I’m a big saver,” and the target’s response in the spending 
condition was “Hmm…I guess people would say I’m a big spender.” Participants evaluated the 
target on the four-item romantic Attractiveness index used previously (α = .95).  
To examine the potential mediating roles of perceived self-control and perceived 
materialism, we then administered two sets of questions in a counterbalanced order. In one set of 
questions, participants assessed the general self-control of the target by rating the likelihood that 
the target is good at resisting temptation, is reliable, engages in healthy practices, eats healthy 
foods, and is able to work effectively toward long-term goals. These five items are a subset of the 
full Self-Control scale developed by Tangney et al. (2004). Likelihood ratings were made on 1-7 
scales (1 = very unlikely and 7 = very likely), and responses were averaged to form a General 
Self-Control index (α = .87). In the other set of questions, participants assessed the target’s 
materialistic values by rating the likelihood that the target admires people who own expensive 
homes, cars, and clothes, likes to own things that impress people, enjoys spending money on 
things that aren’t practical, likes a lot of luxury in his/her life, and would be happier if s/he 
owned nicer things. These five items are a subset of the full Material Values scale developed by 
Richins and Dawson (1992). Likelihood ratings were made on 1-7 scales (1 = very unlikely and 7 
= very likely), and responses were averaged to form a Materialism index (α = .95).  
  
24 
 
The experiment concluded with basic demographic questions and an attention check 
asking participants to recall the spending habits of the target. Five participants who responded 
incorrectly were excluded, resulting in a final sample size of 123.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As before, savers were viewed as significantly more romantically attractive than spenders 
(M = 3.93, SD = 1.48 vs. M = 2.73, SD = 1.24; t(121) = 4.88, p < .001, d = .89).  
We next ran two mediation models to separately assess the roles of General Self-Control 
and Materialism in driving the effect of spending habits on attractiveness (model 4, Hayes 2013). 
First, we examined the potential mediating role of General Self-Control. The target’s spending 
habits were contrast coded (saver = +.5, spender = -.5). As noted above, savers were viewed as 
significantly more romantically attractive than spenders (p < .001). Savers (M = 5.08, SD = .80) 
were also perceived as possessing significantly greater General Self-Control than spenders (M = 
3.60, SD = 1.03;  = 1.48, t(121) = 8.87, p < .001).When we regressed Attractiveness on both 
General Self-Control and the target’s spending habits, we found a significant positive effect of 
General Self-Control ( = .55, t(120) = 4.37, p < .001), but the effect of the target’s spending 
habits was reduced to nonsignificance ( = .39, t(120) = 1.32, p = .19). Further, the indirect 
effect of the target’s spending habits on Attractiveness through General Self-Control was 
significant (.81 95% CI: .43, 1.24), indicative of mediation and supporting hypothesis 2A.   
Second, we examined the potential mediating role of Materialism. Savers (M = 2.62, SD 
= .95) were perceived as significantly lower in Materialism than spenders (M = 5.77, SD = .80;  
= -3.15, t(121) = 19.89, p < .001). However, when we regressed Attractiveness on both 
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Materialism and the target’s spending habits, the effect of Materialism was reduced to 
nonsignificance ( = .04, t(120) < 1), and the effect of the target’s spending habits remained 
significant ( = 1.33, t(120) = 2.60, p = .01). The indirect effect of the target’s spending habits 
on Attractiveness through Materialism was also not significant (-.13 95% CI: -1.06, .81). 
Thus, while savers are naturally viewed as less materialistic than spenders, this difference in 
perceived materialism cannot explain why savers are viewed as more romantically attractive than 
spenders. Rather, the current results suggest that perceptions of general self-control drive the 
romantic preference for savers.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3B: THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF FINANCIAL VIABILITY  
 
Another potential alternative explanation for the greater appeal of savers is that savers are 
expected to possess greater financial resources. Although perceived financial resources are 
typically not top-of-mind when people consider their ideal romantic partner (Fletcher et al. 
1999), experiment 3B assessed the potential mediating role of perceived financial resources, and 
examined whether it was a stronger mediator than perceptions of general self-control.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
We recruited 101 adults aged 18-30 (Mage = 25; 34% female) via MTurk. We initially 
asked participants whether they were more attracted to men or women. We then presented 
participants with a dating profile featuring a target matching participants’ preferred sex. The 
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target described themselves as a saver or a spender. Participants then evaluated the target on the 
four-item romantic Attractiveness index used previously (α = .95).  
We then administered two sets of questions in a counterbalanced order. In one set of 
questions, participants were asked to consider the target’s financial situation 10 years from now. 
We examined expected financial viability because many savers in their 20s may not yet have had 
a chance to accumulate large amounts of savings; financial differences between chronic savers 
and chronic spenders are more likely to reveal themselves over time. Specifically, participants 
assessed the target’s expected financial status by rating the extent to which s/he would be 
financially stable, financially secure, financially comfortable, financially well-off, and financially 
solid in 10 years. Ratings were made on 1-7 scales (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) and 
responses were averaged to form an Anticipated Financial Viability index (α = .97). The other set 
of questions was the same five-item General Self-Control index used in experiment 3A (α = .89).  
The experiment concluded with demographic questions and an attention check asking 
participants to recall the spending habits of the target. Four participants who responded 
incorrectly were excluded, resulting in a final sample size of 97.  
 
Results  
 
 As in prior experiments, savers were viewed as significantly more romantically attractive 
than spenders (M = 4.62, SD = 1.67 vs. M = 3.69, SD = 1.66; t(95) = 2.76, p < .01, d = .57).  
Because there is some conceptual overlap between our potential mediators (Anticipated 
Financial Viability and General Self-Control), we first conducted a confirmatory factor analysis 
to ensure that judgments of targets’ Anticipated Financial Viability and General Self-Control 
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captured distinct, independent constructs. The analysis revealed substantially better fit for a two‐
factor model than for a one‐factor model (∆χ2 = 146.3, p < .001). Thus, judgments of Anticipated 
Financial Viability and General Self-Control reflected distinct constructs.   
We next ran two mediation models to assess whether Anticipated Financial Viability and 
General Self-Control would independently mediate the effect of spending habits on 
attractiveness (model 4, Hayes 2013). First, we examined the mediating role of Anticipated 
Financial Viability. Savers (M = 5.91, SD = .90) were perceived as having significantly greater 
Anticipated Financial Viability than spenders (M = 3.66, SD = 1.53;  = 2.24, t(95) = 8.72, p < 
.001). Once we controlled for the positive effect of Anticipated Financial Viability on attraction 
( = .42, t(94) = 3.30, p = .001), the effect of spending habits on attraction was reduced to 
nonsignificance ( = -.02, t(94) < 1). Further, the indirect effect of spending habits on attraction 
through Anticipated Financial Viability was significant (.95 95% CI: .36, 1.62), indicating 
mediation. Thus, Anticipated Financial Viability is desirable in and of itself, and when analyzed 
in isolation, can explain why savers are viewed as more attractive than spenders. 
Second, we examined the mediating role of General Self-Control. Savers (M = 5.54, SD = 
.83) were perceived as having significantly greater General Self-Control than spenders (M = 
3.87, SD = 1.24;  = 1.67, t(95) = 7.76, p < .001). Once we controlled for the positive effect of 
General Self-Control on attraction ( = .81, t(94) = 5.80, p < .001), the effect of spending habits 
on attraction was reduced to nonsignificance ( = -.42, t(94) = 1.11, p = .27). Further, the 
indirect effect of spending habits on attraction through General Self-Control was significant 
(1.35 95% CI: .86, 1.96), indicating mediation, as in experiment 3A.  
Given that both Anticipated Financial Viability and General Self-Control independently 
mediated the effect of spending habits on attractiveness, we next examined whether one 
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construct was relatively more influential in driving the preference for savers over spenders. We 
specified a mediation model with Anticipated Financial Viability and General Self-Control 
operating in parallel (see figure 2). When both mediators were entered simultaneously, the effect 
of spending habits on attractiveness was nonsignificant ( = -.49, t(93) = 1.20, p = .23), and only 
General Self-Control continued to predict attractiveness ( = .76, t(93) = 4.52, p < .001). 
Anticipated Financial Viability no longer predicted attractiveness ( = .07, t(95) < 1), suggesting 
that General Self-Control was the primary factor driving the preference for savers (indirect 
effect: 1.27 95% CI: .74, 1.94) and supporting hypothesis 2B. 
The previous model specified Anticipated Financial Viability and General Self-Control as 
operating simultaneously. However, one could argue that serial mediation is possible if 
Anticipated Financial Viability is perceived as an outcome of General Self-Control. Presumably, 
having greater restraint today may be viewed as leading to future wealth, which is ultimately 
what is desirable in a mate. To address this possibility, we ran one more mediation model with 
General Self-Control predicting Anticipated Financial Viability, which then predicted romantic 
attraction (model 6, Hayes 2013). While General Self-Control is positively related to Anticipated 
Financial Viability ( = .67, t(94) = 6.57, p < .001), the results show that Anticipated Financial 
Viability does not predict attractiveness ( = .07, t(93) < 1). Thus, the overall serial mediation 
model was not significant (indirect effect: 07 95% CI: -.27, .44). Instead, perceptions of 
General Self-Control continue to mediate the effect of spending habits on attraction (indirect 
effect: 1.42 95% CI: .80, 2.14), above and beyond these alternative pathways. 
 
Discussion 
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Experiment 3B suggests that saving signals both the likelihood of future financial 
resources and the possession of general self-control, and both contribute to the preference for 
savers over spenders. However, supporting hypothesis 2B, the possession of general self-control 
appears to be the primary reason why savers are preferred over spenders. While there are likely 
some situations in which savers are desired primarily because of their perceived financial 
resources (e.g., when people are feeling financially deprived), experiment 3B suggests that the 
primary underlying mechanism favoring savers over spenders is perceptions of self-control.  
One possible limitation of experiment 3B is that self-control was measured in the present 
but financial viability was expected for the future. To address this concern, we conducted a 
follow-up experiment. The procedure was identical to experiment 3B, except we measured 
perceptions of current, rather than future, financial resources (i.e., the extent to which the target 
is currently financially stable, financially secure, financially comfortable, financially well-off, 
and financially solid; α = .95). Ninety-six adults (age range: 18-30, Mage = 23; 44% female) 
recruited via MTurk participated. Both perceptions of general self-control and current financial 
viability independently mediated the influence of the target’s spending habits on romantic 
attraction. However, when we specified a mediation model with current financial viability and 
general self-control operating in parallel, general self-control continued to predict romantic 
attraction ( = .65, t(92) = 3.83, p < .001), but current financial viability did not ( = .16, t(92) = 
1.12, p = .27). In this model, the indirect effect of spending habits on romantic attraction by 
general self-control perceptions was significant (1.21 95% CI: .47, 2.02). Again, a serial 
mediation model where general self-control predicts current financial viability (which ultimately 
predicts romantic attraction) was not significant (indirect effect: 21 95% CI: -.18, .64). 
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Taken together, these results suggest that perceived general self-control is a stronger mediator 
than either perceived current financial viability or perceived future financial viability.  
 
EXPERIMENT 4: ARE SAVERS VIEWED AS MORE PHYSICALLY ATTRACTIVE? 
 
 A novel implication of our proposed underlying mechanism (perceptions of general self-
control) is that savers should be viewed as more physically attractive than spenders. If savers are 
presumably higher in general self-control, they should be expected to take better care of 
themselves as well (e.g., adhering to a balanced diet and exercising regularly). To the extent that 
health and physical fitness increase physical attractiveness (Grammer et al. 2003), savers may 
also be expected to be more physically attractive. Thus, when physical attractiveness is at least 
somewhat ambiguous, observers may expect savers to be more physically attractive and view 
them through that biased lens. On average, then, people should be perceived as more physically 
attractive when they are viewed as savers versus spenders (hypothesis 1B).  
An alternative explanation for such a pattern could be that savers benefit from a positive 
halo effect. In other words, savers might be perceived as not only more physically attractive than 
spenders, but as superior on a variety of other desirable dimensions (e.g., viewed as more fun, 
humorous, intelligent, etc.). Our prior results already suggest that savers are viewed as more 
romantically attractive, higher in general self-control, higher in perceived financial resources, 
and lower in materialism (a generally undesirable trait). However, one positive domain in which 
savers should not clearly excel is the extent to which they are perceived as exciting. By 
definition, self-control is a force that favors prudence over fun. Thus, if savers simply benefit 
from a far-reaching halo effect, they should be viewed as more physically attractive and more 
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exciting than spenders. However, if savers specifically benefit from heightened perceptions of 
self-control, they should be viewed as more physically attractive than spenders, but less exciting.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
We recruited 198 adults aged 18-25 (Mage = 22; 37% female) via MTurk. We initially 
asked participants whether they were more attracted to men or women. We then presented 
participants with a dating profile featuring a target matching participants’ preferred sex. The 
target described themselves as a saver or a spender. As before, the dating profile included one of 
the two headshots from appendix 2. To measure perceptions of physical appeal, participants 
rated the extent to which they found the target physically attractive, sexually appealing, good 
looking, sexy/hot, and gorgeous on 1-7 scales, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much (adapted 
from Eastwick et al. 2011). We averaged responses to these five items to form a Physical 
Attractiveness index (α = .97).  
Note that, despite the presence of a headshot, there is still arguably some ambiguity about 
the target’s physical attractiveness. For example, it is unclear whether this is a particularly 
complimentary or dated picture of the target; often, people use their most flattering photo in their 
dating profile, whether it accurately depicts current reality or not (Hancock and Toma 2009). 
Also, given that these are headshots, it is unclear what the target looks like from the neck down.  
Next, we measured how exciting the target was perceived to be. We utilized a broad set 
of measures; specifically, participants indicated the extent to which they viewed the target as 
adventurous, careful (reverse-scored), cautious (reverse-scored), confident, exciting, fun, 
outgoing, practical (reverse-scored), responsible (reverse-scored), risk-taking, and timid 
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(reverse-scored) on 0-10 scales, where 0 = doesn’t describe at all and 10 = describes very well. 
Subsequent factor analysis of these items revealed two factors, with only five (adventurous, 
confident, exciting, fun, and outgoing) loading solely on an Excitement factor. Thus, we averaged 
these five items to form an Excitement index (α = .92).  
The experiment concluded with demographic questions and an attention check to ensure 
that participants could accurately recall the target’s spending habits. Seven participants who 
responded incorrectly were excluded, resulting in a final sample size of 191.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 Consistent with hypothesis 1B, savers were viewed as significantly more physically 
attractive than spenders (M = 4.95, SD = 1.32 vs. M = 4.42, SD = 1.65; t(189) = 2.46, p < .05, d = 
.36). Recall that actual evidence of physical attraction (i.e., the target’s headshot) was held 
constant across conditions, suggesting that the saver versus spender distinction biased 
perceptions of physical appeal.  
We next examined whether savers were perceived as less exciting than spenders 
(presumably due to higher self-control) or whether savers were perceived as more exciting (due 
to a positive halo effect). We found that savers were viewed as significantly less exciting than 
spenders (M = 5.55, SD = 1.78 vs. M = 6.68, SD = 1.72; t(189) = 4.46, p < .001, d = .65). Given 
that the attributes comprising the Excitement index (i.e., adventurous, confident, exciting, fun, 
and outgoing) are generally viewed positively (in a separate pretest of 60 adults, each of these 
five attributes was significantly more likely to be rated as desirable in a romantic partner than as 
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undesirable; ps < .001), this mean difference provides some evidence against a halo effect 
interpretation for the physical attraction finding.  
To provide further support for the mediating role of general self-control perceptions (and 
to replicate the physical attraction finding), we conducted a follow-up experiment with 100 
adults recruited via MTurk (age range: 18-25, Mage = 22; 30% female). Targets indicated that 
they were a saver or a spender as before, and participants rated the target’s perceived physical 
attractiveness using the same five-item scale from experiment 4 (α = .93). We then measured the 
target’s perceived general self-control using six items (e.g., the extent to which they are expected 
to “plan tasks carefully,” α = .88). As in experiment 4, savers were viewed as significantly more 
physically attractive than spenders (M = 4.71, SD = 1.63 vs. M = 4.00, SD = 1.49; t(98) = 2.27, p 
< .05, d = .46). However, when we regressed physical attractiveness on general self-control and 
the target’s spending habits, we found a positive effect of general self-control ( = .66, t(97) = 
4.27, p < .001), but no effect of the target’s spending habits ( = -.38, t(97) < 1). Further, the 
indirect effect of the target’s spending habits on physical attractiveness through general self-
control was significant (1.09 95% CI: .56, 1.72), indicative of mediation. Thus, this follow-
up experiment suggests that perceptions of general self-control also underlie the effect of 
spending habits on perceived physical attractiveness.  
We have thus far demonstrated a robust preference for savers over spenders, but it is 
worth considering boundary conditions. Mates high in general self-control likely possess a 
number of attractive attributes, but choosing such a mate may require sacrificing stimulation. 
Self-control is likely viewed as a force that normally favors prudence over fun, and this 
perceived excitement-deficit could prove costly. The extent to which people value an exciting 
romantic partner is likely to depend on situational circumstances (e.g., anticipated relationship 
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seriousness; Fletcher et al. 2004) and the extent to which individuals themselves are chronically 
(in)tolerant of boredom. In particular, the high levels of self-control inferred from saving 
behavior may reduce the relative appeal of savers when potential mates crave excitement. 
Formally, we hypothesize: 
 
H3: Factors that increase the need for stimulation or reduce the tolerance for boredom 
will reduce the romantic appeal of savers.  
 
We next aim to collect converging evidence for hypothesis 3 by examining the 
moderating roles of anticipated relationship seriousness (experiment 5) and individuals’ 
(chronic) boredom susceptibility (experiment 6).   
 
EXPERIMENT 5: THE MODERATING ROLE OF RELATIONSHIP SERIOUSNESS 
 
In experiment 5, we examined whether savers are more attractive than spenders across a 
variety of relationship contexts. In particular, we examined attractiveness in the context of a non-
serious romantic fling, a somewhat serious dating relationship, and a serious enduring 
relationship. We anticipated that savers would be preferred to spenders across any type of serious 
relationship due to the desirable benefits of general self-control. However, the prospect of a 
romantic fling tends to heighten attention to both physical attractiveness and excitement (or 
“vitality”; Fletcher et al. 2004). Given that savers have a significant but modest advantage over 
spenders in terms of perceived physical attractiveness, but are perceived as much less exciting 
than spenders (experiment 4), we predicted that the romantic fling context would reduce the 
relative appeal of savers over spenders (hypothesis 3).  
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Participants and Procedure 
 
Two hundred adults (age range: 18-28, Mage = 22; 46% female) recruited via MTurk 
completed the experiment in exchange for a small payment. The experiment followed a 2 
(Target’s Spending Habits: Saver vs. Spender) × 3 (Relationship Seriousness: Non-Serious vs. 
Somewhat Serious vs. Serious) between-subjects design. We initially asked participants whether 
they were more attracted to men or women, and then presented them with a target matching their 
preferred sex. The target described themselves as a saver or a spender. 
Participants considered the target for one of three types of relationships (descriptions 
were adapted from Buss and Schmitt 1993; Sundie et al. 2011) before evaluating the target on a 
1-7 scale, where 1 = not at all attractive and 7 = very attractive. Participants randomly assigned 
to the Non-Serious condition were asked to “consider this person as someone you might have a 
‘romantic fling’ with. That is, consider this person as someone you might have casual sex with, 
perhaps for one evening. How attractive would Andrew (Andrea) be as a romantic fling 
partner for you, yourself?” Participants in the Somewhat Serious condition were asked to 
“consider this person as someone you might date for a while. That is, consider this person as 
someone you might date for a few months and introduce to some of your friends. It is not at all 
clear whether this relationship will turn into something permanent. How attractive would 
Andrew (Andrea) be as a dating partner for you, yourself?” Lastly, participants in the Serious 
condition were asked to “consider this person as someone you might form a serious romantic 
relationship with. That is, consider this person as someone you might date for a few years, and 
possibly marry and have a family with. How attractive would Andrew (Andrea) be as a serious 
romantic partner for you, yourself?”  
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The experiment concluded with overall impressions of the target (i.e., five semantic 
differential items like negative/positive and bad/good, measured on 7-point scales; α = .97),3 
demographic questions, and an attention check requiring participants to recall the target’s answer 
to the money question. Fourteen participants (7% of the sample) who responded incorrectly were 
excluded, resulting in a final sample size of 186. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The results of a 2 (Target’s Spending Habits) × 3 (Relationship Seriousness) ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction (F(2, 180) = 4.12, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .04; see figure 3). Consistent 
with our reasoning, planned contrasts revealed that savers were viewed as significantly more 
attractive than spenders in the context of a serious relationship (M = 5.09, SD = 1.79 vs. M = 
3.68, SD = 1.81; t(180) = 3.56, p < .001, d = .79). We also found that savers were viewed as 
significantly more attractive than spenders in the context of a somewhat serious relationship      
(M = 4.93, SD = 1.51 vs. M = 3.68, SD = 1.59; t(180) = 2.88, p < .01, d = .82). However, in the 
context of a non-serious relationship, savers and spenders did not significantly differ in their 
appeal (M = 4.35, SD = 1.52 vs. M = 4.52, SD = 1.67; t(180) < 1).    
Although one could argue that participants do not give much consideration to non-serious 
romantic partners in general (hence the null effect for this relationship frame), inattentiveness 
cannot explain the lack of differentiation between savers and spenders in terms of attractiveness. 
Specifically, participants did differentiate between savers and spenders in their attitudinal 
evaluations. A 2 × 3 ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of target’s spending habits 
                                                          
3
 One of the reasons we included global impressions in this experiment was because the dependent variable was a 
single attraction item, rather than the four-item romantic Attractiveness index used previously. 
  
37 
 
(F(2, 180) = 44.68, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .20). Holding relationship seriousness constant, overall 
impressions of savers were significantly more favorable than impressions of spenders (M = 5.55, 
SD = 1.29 vs. M = 4.14, SD = 1.52). Thus, participants were paying attention to the individual 
targets, giving us greater confidence that the saver versus spender distinction is driving the effect 
rather than disinterest in casual sexual relationships.  
These results suggest that savers are broadly but not universally appealing. In 
relationships that are anticipated to be at least somewhat serious, savers were viewed as 
significantly more appealing than spenders. However, the prospect of a non-serious romantic 
fling eliminated the preference for savers over spenders, presumably because savers are viewed 
as much less exciting than spenders. 
 
EXPERIMENT 6: THE MODERATING ROLE OF BOREDOM SUSCEPTIBILITY 
 
In our final experiment, we examined whether observers’ chronic boredom susceptibility 
moderates the influence of a target’s spending habits on romantic attraction. Prior research 
suggests that individuals chronically differ in their susceptibility to boredom (Zuckerman 1979, 
1994), which is characterized as “an aversion for repetitive experience of any kind, routine work, 
or dull and boring people” (Zuckerman 1979, 103). It is related to, but distinct from, other 
components of generalized sensation seeking (Zuckerman 1994), such as thrill and adventure 
seeking (involvement in physically risky activities like mountain climbing or sky diving), 
experience seeking (a desire to engage in novel, unconventional experiences like exploring 
unfamiliar cities), and disinhibition (interest in social drinking, sexual activities, and partying).  
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It is possible that constantly exerting self-control and avoiding temptation may lead to (or 
at least be expected to lead to) a boring, uneventful life. After all, savers are perceived as 
significantly less exciting than spenders (experiment 4). Therefore, we predicted that people who 
are chronically high in boredom susceptibility (and find boredom particularly aversive) would 
show less of a romantic preference for savers over spenders (hypothesis 3).  
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
We recruited 120 adults aged 18-30 (Mage = 25; 34% female) via MTurk. The experiment 
consisted of one between-subjects factor (Target’s Spending Habits: Saver vs. Spender) and one 
measured factor (Chronic Boredom Susceptibility). Participants were randomly assigned to view 
the dating profile of an opposite-sex target who described themselves as either a saver or a 
spender. Participants evaluated the target on the four-item romantic Attractiveness index used 
previously (α = .95). Following about two minutes of unrelated tasks, participants completed a 
10-item Boredom Susceptibility scale (BSS; Zuckerman 1979), which consists of dichotomous 
items assessing the extent to which individuals dislike repetitive experiences and dull people 
(e.g., respondents either endorse the statement “I have no patience with dull or boring persons” 
or the statement “I find something interesting in almost every person I talk with”; KR-20 
coefficient for scales with dichotomous items: .62). This was the only individual difference scale 
administered in the experiment.  
The experiment concluded with demographic questions and an attention check to ensure 
that participants could recall the spending habits of the target. Three participants who responded 
incorrectly were excluded, resulting in a final sample size of 117. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
 We regressed Attractiveness ratings on spending habits (saver = +.5, spender = -.5), BSS 
scores, and a spending habits × BSS interaction term. Replicating previous experiments, there 
was a significant main effect of spending habits (B = 1.46, t(113) = 5.05, p < .001, d = .88): 
savers (M = 4.72, SD = 1.67) were viewed as significantly more attractive than spenders (M = 
3.29, SD = 1.58). BSS scores did not predict mate attractiveness (B = -.10, t(113) = 1.43, p = 
.16). However, the main effect of the target’s spending habits on attractiveness was qualified by 
a significant interaction between the target’s spending habits and participants’ BSS scores (B =   
-.45, t(113) = 3.26, p < .01; see figure 4). To probe the interaction, we used a series of planned 
simple slopes tests. Following Aiken and West (1991), we examined the relationship between 
spending habits and attractiveness at two levels of BSS: low (one SD below the mean) and high 
(one SD above the mean). At low levels of BSS, there was a significant romantic preference for 
savers over spenders (B = 2.43, t(113) = 5.95, p < .001). However, at high levels of BSS, there 
was no significant difference in the romantic appeal of savers and spenders (B = .53, t(113) = 
1.27, p = .21). Thus, consistent with hypothesis 3, the natural romantic preference for savers is 
attenuated among people who are especially susceptible to boredom.  
 Experiment 6 suggests that people who chronically have little tolerance for boredom do 
not show a preference for savers over spenders, presumably because a relationship with a saver is 
more likely to produce boredom. However, it is possible that an omitted variable (an unmeasured 
individual difference correlated with boredom susceptibility) is driving the decreased desire for 
savers. To obtain converging evidence, we conducted a follow-up experiment with 80 
undergraduates (54% female). Participants were asked to imagine that it was Friday afternoon 
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and either “you’re happy to be finishing up an incredibly boring week at work. In general, you 
like your job, but you found this week’s tasks to be especially mundane, dull, and uninteresting” 
(Boredom condition) or “you’re happy to be finishing up your work. In general, you like your 
job” (Control condition). Participants were then asked to imagine going on a blind date that 
evening, and to indicate whether they would like their blind date to be a spender or a saver (1-11 
scale, where 1 = a big spender, 6 = no preference, and 11= a big saver). Because it was a blind 
date, we did not provide images of target individuals. Omitting pictures also addressed a possible 
concern with the stimulus images used in previous experiments (see appendix 2). Conceptually 
replicating experiment 6, Boredom participants expressed less of a preference for savers than did 
Control participants (M = 4.45, SD = 1.91 vs. M = 6.65, SD = 1.89; t(78) = 5.18, p < .001, d = 
1.17). Thus, consistent with hypothesis 3, experiment 6 and the follow-up experiment suggest 
that boredom reduces the romantic appeal of savers.  
Taken together, experiments 5 and 6 suggest that the most common preference in 
romantic contexts is for a safe and comfortable partner (favoring savers), but traits and states that 
reduce one’s tolerance for boredom reduce the natural appeal of savers. Strikingly, though, 
neither of the contexts we examined revealed a significant preference for spenders over savers. 
Factors that reduce the tolerance for boredom may not lead people to devalue the other positive 
features of savers (e.g., greater perceived physical attractiveness). Thus, the romantic appeal of 
savers is diminished when people are less tolerant of boredom, but not completely eliminated. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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Consumer research has made great strides toward understanding how social motivations 
influence consumption behavior (e.g., Dunn, Aknin, and Norton 2008; Gorlin and Dhar 2012; 
Griskevicius et al. 2007; Mead et al. 2011; Simpson, Griskevicius, and Rothman 2012). 
However, far less is known about how consumption behavior influences the formation of social 
relationships. Some prior work suggests that a single episode of lavish spending by men may be 
more effective at attracting women than a single episode of conservative spending (Sundie et al. 
2011, study 4). Yet, we find a robust preference for savers over spenders (i.e., individuals who 
have a relatively low MPC vs. high MPC, respectively) both in terms of romantic attraction and 
physical attraction (experiments 1, 2A, 2B, and 4). Perceptions of general self-control underlie 
the preference for savers over spenders, above and beyond inferences about materialism and 
financial viability (experiments 3A and 3B). High general self-control is not always a desirable 
attribute in a potential partner, however, and we find that dispositional and contextual factors that 
increase the desire for stimulation reduce the preference for savers (experiments 5 and 6).  
In general, the robust preference for savers over spenders was not moderated by 
participants’ gender. In most experiments (1, 3B, 4, 5, and 6), there was no significant interaction 
between participants’ gender and the target’s spending habits (ps > .10; see table 1). In the other 
experiments (2A, 2B, and 3A), there was a significant interaction (p < .05) between participants’ 
gender and the target’s spending habits, but the nature of this interaction differed across 
experiments. In experiment 2A, female participants were especially sensitive to the saver/spender 
distinction (showing an especially strong preference for savers). By contrast, in experiments 2B 
and 3A, male participants were especially sensitive to the saver/spender distinction (showing an 
especially strong preference for savers). Thus, taken together, there is no clear pattern of 
moderation by participant gender. Overall, savers are favorably perceived, regardless of gender.  
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Our work contributes to the broader literature on self-control. Prior research has suggested 
that self-control in the spending and saving domain is distinct from general self-control (e.g., 
Haws et al. 2012), but we find that self-control in the spending and saving domain is interpreted 
by observers as a signal of general self-control. Our results suggest that self-control is generally 
(though not universally) desirable in romantic partners, and in particular that self-control itself is 
more desirable than a monetary consequence of self-control (financial viability). We also find that 
perceptions of general self-control favorably bias perceptions of physical attractiveness.   
It is worth considering whether and how our results can be reconciled with those of Sundie 
et al. (2011, study 4), who found that women viewed men who recently purchased a new Porsche 
Boxster as more attractive dating partners than men who recently purchased a new Honda Civic. 
Our perspective suggests that the car-buying target may have always been viewed as a spender. In 
both conditions, the recent purchase of a new car is the only information provided that could have 
been diagnostic of one’s saving versus spending habits. However, the target may have been 
viewed as more financially viable when purchasing the relatively expensive Porsche than when 
purchasing the relatively inexpensive Honda. Thus, when viewed from this perspective, Sundie et 
al.’s study 4 finding is essentially that women found financially viable spenders to be more 
attractive dating partners than less financially viable spenders. This finding neither contradicts nor 
bolsters our perspective, which focuses on the differences between spenders and savers. It is also 
worth highlighting that while Sundie et al.’s study 4 design may appear similar to our experiment 
2A design (where the target either planned to spend a large or small proportion of a windfall), 
note that available financial resources (i.e., the size of the windfall) was held constant in 
experiment 2A. By contrast, the target who purchased the Porsche in Sundie et al. was likely 
assumed to possess greater financial resources than the target who purchased the Honda.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Our work examines the influence of spending habits on initial attraction, but future 
research could examine whether spending habits predict actual relationship formation (e.g., by 
examining whether savers are more coveted at speed dating events). If savers are more desirable, 
they may be able to be more selective and thus secure more attractive partners. We used carefully 
controlled experiments to ensure internal validity and establish causality, but correlational 
evidence on relationship formation would also be valuable.  
We have proposed that participants draw inferences from a target’ self-reported spending 
habits which, in turn, influence attraction toward the target. Arguably, this inferential process is 
only relevant outside the lab if people can spontaneously distinguish between savers and 
spenders. To address this possibility, we examined the detectability of real-life savers versus 
spenders in an incentive-compatible study in which participants evaluated themselves and then 
one another, without communicating (see appendix 3). The results revealed a significant, positive 
relationship between individuals’ self-reported habits and observers’ averaged ratings (r(136) = 
.32, p < .001; cf. Vazire et al. 2008), suggesting a high degree of accuracy. As we graded 
participants’ guesses of each other, we asked them to list some cues they utilized when 
evaluating others’ financial habits. The most common responses to this open-ended question 
included visible material goods (e.g., clothing, jewelry, hats), appearance (e.g., hairstyles, make-
up usage), and outward demeanor (e.g., posture, facial expressions). Although beyond the scope 
of the current paper, future research might explore the process of inferring financial habits (e.g., 
compare the cues observers actually utilize when judging others’ saving versus spending habits 
and the cues observers should utilize when judging others; Brunswik 1956). Our theoretical 
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account suggests that attributes that signal high general self-control may also signal saving 
tendencies. For instance, when we presented a separate sample of 102 adults with Person A who 
“rarely exercises” and Person B who “exercises regularly,” and asked them to guess which person 
is more likely to be a saver, 78% guessed Person B (p < .001, sign test). By contrast, attributes 
that suggest a lack of general self-control (e.g., obesity, tattoos) may signal chronic spending.  
Future work could also examine whether one’s own spending versus saving tendencies 
moderate the romantic appeal of savers (note that we did not find support for this possibility in 
experiment 1, but this could have been due to low variance in a forced choice question). To the 
extent that savers enjoy saving and spenders enjoy spending, one would expect the typical 
positive assortment pattern (i.e., savers seeking savers and spenders seeking spenders; Watson et 
al. 2004). Previous research on parallel self-control decisions (i.e., when a temptation is faced 
simultaneously by multiple people but each person makes an independent choice) supports this 
notion. Specifically, individuals express greater affiliation toward someone when they both 
indulge or abstain together versus situations where one person indulges and the other abstains 
(Lowe and Haws 2014). The implication is that two spenders may bond over partnering in crime 
(i.e., “let’s splurge!”), whereas two savers may bond over moral support (i.e., “at least we won’t 
feel guilty”). Of particular relevance to savers, recent work also indicates that individuals with 
high self-control actively position themselves around others who promote self-regulation 
(vanDellen et al. 2015). Although existing literature suggests that people may be drawn to others 
with similar financial habits, there is reason to believe that both savers and spenders prefer savers 
as romantic partners. Spenders, who personally find saving difficult, may be the most likely to 
view savers as possessing high self-control and hold them in especially high regard. The 
demographics of our samples provide additional evidence against positive assortment. In 
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experiment 1 and the detectability study, the population was essentially 50% savers and 50% 
spenders. If people are attracted to similar others, we would not have observed a robust preference 
for savers across experiments 1-6. Although our current data do not support an assortative mating 
explanation, a more nuanced analysis of individuals’ own financial habits would be insightful.  
Given that money is a common source of conflict in romantic relationships, future work 
should examine how partners’ spending and saving tendencies contribute to relationship quality 
(both in terms of happiness and financial outcomes). If savers actually have greater general self-
control than spenders, people are likely to be more financially secure and happier when their 
partner is a saver (cf. Vohs et al. 2011). However, people who are in a romantic relationship with 
a saver may relax in their own pursuit of financial goals, “outsourcing” financial discipline to 
their more responsible partner (Fitzsimons and Finkel 2011). One must be cautious when 
outsourcing goal achievement, as recent research suggests that overreliance on high self-control 
partners has negative interpersonal consequences. Compared to those with relatively low self-
control, high self-control partners report being relied upon more, which predicts greater feelings 
of fatigue and subsequent dissatisfaction (Koval et al. 2015, study 6). Assuming savers actually 
possess high self-control, maintaining a relationship with a saver might require a certain degree of 
self-sufficiency and extra vigilance of his or her needs as a way of ensuring continued happiness.   
In addition to the inferences examined here, spending habits might convey information 
about other important attributes, such as general intelligence or generosity, which are arguably 
byproducts of one’s level of general self-control (e.g., behaving generously might require 
suppressing the urge to be selfish; cf. Skitka et al. 2002). Given the breadth of possible inferences, 
there is reason to believe that spending habits could influence the formation of many types of 
relationships beyond the romantic realm (e.g., friends and business partners; cf. Scott, Mende, and 
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Bolton 2013). As noted earlier, we focused on the role of spending and saving within the context 
of romantic relationships because prior research on spending and relationships had focused 
primarily on romantic contexts (e.g., Griskevicius et al. 2007; Sundie et al. 2011; Wang and 
Griskevicius 2014), and because spending and saving behavior is more likely to play a role in 
romantic relationships than in non-romantic relationships.  
More broadly, our results may have implications for advertisers. Commercials often 
feature brand users who chronically spend (e.g., Acura RLX’s widely panned “Luxury, Luxury” 
commercial) or who chronically save (e.g., ING’s Orange Money commercials). Our results raise 
the possibility that commercials that feature spenders may literally “turn off” some consumers, 
whereas commercials that feature savers may produce unexpected (positive) feelings among 
viewers. Whether the attractiveness of featured brand users spills over to influence feelings 
toward the brand is an important open question for future research.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Saving conveys myriad financial benefits and behavioral researchers have accordingly 
devoted a great deal of effort to designing interventions that improve saving rates (e.g., Soman 
and Zhao 2011). Our work reveals that saving not only conveys financial benefits, but also 
interpersonal benefits—savers are viewed as possessing greater general self-control, which 
increases both their romantic and physical attractiveness. Of course, general self-control is not 
always desired in a prospective mate: dispositional and situational forces that increase the need 
for stimulation attenuate the relative preference for savers over spenders. Thus, savers may win 
in the mating market, but only when potential mates do not crave excitement. 
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CHAPTER III  
Managing Debt and Managing Each Other:                                                                                  
The Interpersonal Dynamics of Shared Financial Decisions 
 
Although a completely debt-free life is not necessarily ideal (e.g., a mortgage with 
favorable terms can be a good investment) or practical (e.g., having to finance higher education 
through student loans), minimizing debt is an important goal for many consumers. Carrying debt 
comes with obvious financial costs: credit card debt, for example, is financed at an average 
annual percentage interest rate (APR) of 13% (Federal Reserve 2014). In addition to direct costs, 
credit card debt is associated with diminished psychological well-being (Brown, Taylor, and 
Price 2005) and diminished health (e.g., higher diastolic blood pressure; Sweet et al. 2013). A 
credit report filled with debt can also have a number of negative interpersonal consequences, 
such as a reduced ability to impress prospective employers (Rivlin 2013) or prospective mates 
(as illustrated by websites such as CreditScoreDating.com; Silver-Greenberg 2012). Within 
ongoing romantic relationships, debt is a common source of arguments and reduced relationship 
satisfaction (Dew 2007, 2008, 2011).  
Given these significant implications, several recent studies have sought to understand 
how individuals make debt repayment decisions (e.g., Amar et al. 2011; Besharat, Varki, and 
Craig 2015; Brown and Lahey 2014; Gal and McShane 2012; Hershfield and Roese 2015; Kettle 
et al. 2015; Navarro-Martinez et al. 2011; Stewart 2009). Note that the focus of this work 
extends beyond earlier consumer decisions regarding credit acquisition and usage—rather than 
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investigate how consumers get into debt, this work focuses on how they get out of debt. As such, 
these papers have considered various contextual factors surrounding debt repayment, including 
topics ranging from minimum payment size and informational disclosure to motivational effects. 
However, many of life’s largest debts are jointly held and, to some extent, jointly managed (e.g., 
mortgages, car loans). Couples are also more likely than individuals to hold multiple debts (Fay 
2015). Thus, it is important to understand whether and why repayment biases observed at the 
individual-level generalize to the couple-level.  
One costly bias previously identified at the individual-level is debt account aversion 
(DAA). Specifically, when indebted consumers must choose between paying off a small debt and 
chipping away at a larger debt with a larger interest rate, they tend to pay off the small debt 
(Amar et al. 2011). For example, imagine an individual who has an extra $2,000 at the end of the 
month. S/he is deciding whether to pay off a student loan (e.g., an account with a $2,000 balance 
and interest rate of 2.5%) or make an extra car payment (e.g., an account with a $20,000 balance 
and interest rate of 5%). Prior research on DAA suggests that this individual will choose to close 
out the (smaller in magnitude) student loan instead of reducing the (higher APR) car loan. A 
number of psychological factors appear to contribute to this tendency, including the temptation 
of pursuing goals nearest completion and the pleasure of eliminating an obligation. Often, getting 
out of debt completely is a complex task, so people might be inclined to break down the task into 
a series of smaller, more manageable steps (cf. Newell and Simon 1972). Previous work also 
indicates that motivation to achieve a goal increases as proximity to the goal increases (Kivetz, 
Urminsky, and Zheng 2006). Thus, indebted consumers who can only set aside a limited amount 
of money for debt repayment may be particularly tempted to allocate those dollars to the debt 
that is closest to the $0 goal, rather than a larger debt that cannot be paid off anytime soon.  
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Although DAA is financially suboptimal, there is some debate surrounding its potential 
benefits to consumers. Personal finance guru Dave Ramsey (2009) has most famously advocated 
the “debt snowball method” (focusing on closing small debts because they represent “quick 
wins” that help consumers “stay pumped enough to get out of debt completely”). Consistent with 
this “small wins” approach, individuals tend to complete an unpleasant, tedious task faster when 
its components are presented in order of ascending length (i.e., the subtasks are arranged from 
shortest to longest) rather than descending or equal length (Brown and Lahey 2014). Evidence 
from the field further supports the efficacy of the debt snowball method, at least for certain types 
of consumers. Gal and McShane (2012) examined nearly 6,000 consumers who had enrolled in a 
debt settlement program (due to difficulties they had paying off their debt). Enrollees made 
payments to a savings account devoted to debt repayment. The settlement company negotiated 
with creditors to reduce enrollees’ balances, and used savings account payments to reduce debts. 
Remaining in the settlement program requires a sustained financial commitment from enrollees, 
and the key dependent measure was whether enrollees remained in the program over the course 
of the study. Gal and McShane (2012) found that the number of debts that were paid off 
completely was a better predictor of sticking with the program than total amount of debt repaid. 
For example, an enrollee was more likely to remain in the program if s/he saw two $1,000 debts 
paid off than if s/he saw a single $2,000 debt paid off. Of course, enrollees did not choose which 
debts to pay off, and thus it is unclear whether the same pattern would persist if enrollees were 
making the allocation decisions themselves. Prior work suggests that personally achieving 
subgoals (e.g., paying off a particular debt) might reduce the motivation to pursue an overarching 
goal (e.g., getting out of debt completely), particularly when the distance to that overarching goal 
is known with certainty (Amir and Ariely 2008). To the extent that one’s total amount of debt is 
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more or less known with certainty, this may be a situation in which achieving a subgoal 
promotes complacency.  
Until now, prior research has only considered whether DAA exists and is beneficial for 
individual consumers. However, many debts are jointly held (e.g., shared credit cards, car loans, 
and mortgages), and in these cases, repayment decisions may invite input from all indebted 
parties. Interestingly, facing financial tasks together may be beneficial—a recent report from 
UBS Wealth Management Americas (2014) finds that couples are more confident and satisfied 
with their finances when they share responsibility. Neither men nor women prefer operating as 
the exclusive decision maker. Of course, these results are correlational and speak to 
psychological well-being rather than actual economic outcomes. And so the question remains: 
Do couples manage debt differently (for better or for worse) than individuals? 
Unfortunately, there are reasons to be pessimistic about couples’ ability to overcome 
DAA. The group dynamics literature indicates that groups tend to value conformity when faced 
with joint decisions, sometimes to the detriment of decision quality (Asch 1956; Janis 1972). 
Thus, partners may yield to each other’s (potentially suboptimal) opinions in exchange for 
relational harmony. To encourage smooth interactions, couples may focus their discussion on 
attributes that are easier to understand (Hsee 1996) and attempt to reach agreement on how to 
manage those attributes. Because many people struggle to understand the accumulation of 
compound interest (e.g., McKenzie and Liersch 2011), couples may prefer discussing the number 
of debts instead of their respective interest rates. In addition, interpersonal deliberation among 
like-minded people can amplify existing preferences (Schkade, Sunstein, and Hastie 2007). 
Thus, if most people naturally prefer to focus on closing small debts (Amar et al. 2011), joint 
decision making may make this preference even more pronounced. The influence of a partner 
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can even manifest without verbal communication. Simply having another person present during a 
task can magnify dominant responses (i.e., social facilitation; Zajonc 1965), which, in our 
context, would be behavior consistent with DAA. 
More recent research within consumer behavior echoes earlier work on group harmony. 
When married individuals differ in their level of general self-control, the spouse with lower self-
control tends to exert greater influence on joint self-control decisions (Dzhogleva and Lamberton 
2014). The authors propose that high self-control partners are more likely to set aside their 
individual preferences and accommodate to a low self-control partner, presumably in an effort to 
maintain interpersonal harmony. While these authors presented couples with a single 
hypothetical scenario about spending money (i.e., how much they were willing to charge on their 
credit card for a three-day vacation; study 2B), it is unclear what would happen if couples were 
presented with incentivized decisions. Rather than acquiesce to a less financially optimal partner, 
couples may be motivated to follow the lead of the more optimal partner. Thus, whether the 
accommodation process observed by Dzhogleva and Lamberton (2014) extends to couples 
making a series of incentivized financial decisions remains an open question.   
Despite reasons for pessimism, there are arguably greater reasons for optimism 
surrounding couples’ debt repayment decisions. The presence of another person means that 
preferred strategies must be explained and justified (Lerner and Tetlock 1999), and it might be 
difficult to justify paying off small debts on the grounds that it provides relief or happiness.
4
 The 
                                                          
4
 We explored whether individuals find it “fun” to pay off small debts in a pilot experiment. Specifically, we asked 
186 adults (Mage = 35; 50% female) to imagine allocating a $100 tax rebate across two credit cards: 1) a Visa with a 
$1,000 balance and a 15% APR and 2) a MasterCard with a $100 balance and a 10% APR. We asked participants 
what they would actually do (actual intentions condition), what they rationally should do (financially optimal goal 
condition), or what they should do to maximize their happiness (hedonic goal condition). The key dependent 
variable was how much money they allocated to the low-balance, low APR account (MasterCard). We found that 
actual intentions (M = $48.87, SD = 47.71) were closer to hedonically driven intentions (M = $51.43, SD = 45.50; 
t(183) < 1) than financially driven intentions (M = $32.79, SD = 43.63; t(183) = 1.95, p = .05, d = .35). Thus, paying 
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deliberation involved in justifying or questioning different repayment strategies might also 
increase the likelihood of understanding and implementing the financially optimal repayment 
strategy of focusing on high-interest debts (cf. Hastie 1986).   
Working with others also boosts performance on tasks with easily “demonstrable” 
solutions (Hastie 1986). The debt management game we use in our experiments (to be described 
shortly) falls within this category because its design meets the following four conditions 
identified by Laughlin and Ellis (1986): (1) optimal decisions can be verified mathematically, (2) 
account sizes and interest rates provide enough information for optimal decisions to be made 
(i.e., no complex calculations are required, as basic logic is sufficient to recognize the optimal 
decision), (3) partners unable to reach optimal decisions on their own have enough information 
to accept a correct solution when proposed by their partner, and (4) the optimal partner has 
sufficient ability, time, and motivation to describe the optimal decision to the suboptimal partner. 
Thus, couples should perform better than individuals in the game because an optimal solution is 
present and can be readily communicated to partners.  
Couples’ financial decision making may also benefit from pre-existing knowledge of 
each other’s strengths and weaknesses. If one partner has a comparative advantage in budgeting 
and investing (i.e., s/he is a relative “expert” in the financial domain), the couple will make more 
optimal decisions if they follow the lead of the financial expert rather than the non-expert. 
Interestingly, recent research indicates that couples tend to diverge in their financial expertise 
over time (Ward and Lynch 2015). As the financial expert in a relationship attends to, processes, 
and uses financial information over the years, the non-expert’s financial literacy may actually 
stagnate or decline. This work is consistent with the notion of transactive memory within 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
off debt may be a fun experience—participants’ actual and happiness-maximizing preferences both favored paying 
off the small debt, whereas rational preferences favored chipping away at the high-balance, high-APR debt.  
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relationships, whereby couples develop a shared system for information management such that 
each partner takes charge of only a portion of total information (Wegner 1986; Wegner, Erber, 
and Raymond 1991; Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel 1985). These systems allow partners to 
effectively offload task responsibility to the partner with greater competence in a given domain. 
The presence of these systems within couples (vs. pairs of strangers, for example) should make it 
easier for them to discern who has greater financial expertise and allocate decision making 
responsibility accordingly. Thus, we predict that couples will be able to identify the partner with 
greater financial expertise and place greater weight on that partner’s (presumably more optimal) 
debt repayment preferences.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1: DO COUPLE MEMBERS MAKE MORE FINANCIALLY OPTIMAL 
DECISIONS TOGETHER OR APART? 
 
To investigate couples’ susceptibility to DAA, we randomly assigned members of 
romantic couples to complete a debt management game individually or as a couple. The key 
dependent variable was performance in an incentivized debt management game.  
 
Participants and Procedure  
 
We recruited 63 heterosexual couples through a paid subject pool. On average, couple 
members were 30 years old (age range 18-73) and reported being romantically involved with 
their current partner for about 6.5 years. We recruited couples who were at least cohabitating 
(i.e., living together, but not married) to ensure shared financial history. The vast majority of 
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couples met our inclusion criteria (60/63 were cohabitating, engaged, or married), but three 
couples did report that they were dating and had never lived together. Our results do not 
substantively change if we omit these three dating couples, so we elected to include them in our 
sample. Each couple member completed the experiment in exchange for a $10 show-up fee plus 
anything they earned during the experiment.  
 
 Overview of the debt management game. In the computerized game (Amar et al. 2011), 
participants are initially saddled with six different debt accounts varying in size and interest rate 
(see table 2). Critically, larger debts tend to have larger interest rates, meaning that participants 
must stay focused on the larger debts to perform well. The game lasts 25 rounds corresponding 
to 25 “years.” Participants receive an annual (per-round) salary of $5,000 and three surprise 
“bonuses” (i.e., $20,000 in Round 6, $15,000 in Round 12, and $40,000 in Round 19) that they 
must use to repay one or more of the open debt accounts. Participants were told that they must 
use the entire amount of cash available (i.e., their salary and bonuses) to pay down debt because 
there were no saving or spending opportunities. Participants repay debts by typing in the amount 
they want to allocate to each debt and then approving it. After participants approve their 
decision, the program presents the updated balances (i.e., principal plus accrued interest) and a 
graph displays the past and current standing of each debt account.  
The goal of the game is to end the game with the lowest amount of debt possible. A 
financially optimal player, who allocates all available resources to the open debt account with the 
highest interest rate, will end the game with three open debt accounts totaling $29,428 (see figure 
5). A debt account-averse player, who allocates all available resources toward the smallest open 
debt account, will end the game with one open debt account totaling $47,861 (see figure 6).  
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Couples had the opportunity to earn additional money, beyond the $10 show-up fee, 
based upon game performance. Specifically, each partner could earn $12 if their total debt was 
less than $30,000, $8 if their total debt was between $30,001 and $35,000, $4 if their total debt 
was between $35,001 and $40,000, and $0 if their total debt was greater than $40,000. These 
amounts were per individual couple member, so a couple playing the game together could earn 
up to $24 between the two of them.  
After couples received instructions for the game and asked any questions, they were 
randomly assigned by session to complete the game individually (N = 21 couples) or together (N 
= 42 couples). Thus, the design resulted in 42 data points per condition. Participants in the 
Individual condition completed the game individually at private computer workstations. They 
were asked not to communicate with their partner or other participants during the experiment. 
Participants in the Couple condition completed the game with their romantic partner at one 
private computer workstation. They were encouraged to communicate with each other during the 
experiment, as they would be making decisions as a pair. Following the game, couple members 
in the Couple condition returned to individual workstations where everyone proceeded to answer 
questions about their experience individually. 
 
Dependent variable measures. In an individual follow-up survey, couple members 
indicated the degree to which they found the debt management game complex, difficult, easy 
(reverse-scored), enjoyable, entertaining, frustrating, fun, and interesting on 0-10 scales, where 0 
= not at all and 10 = very much. We included these measures to ensure that couples had similar 
experiences with the game itself, regardless of experimental condition. Subsequent factor 
analysis of these items revealed two factors. We averaged four items to form an Enjoyment index 
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(enjoyable, entertaining, fun, and interesting; α = .93) and the other four items to form a 
Difficulty index (complex, difficult, easy (reverse-scored), and frustrating; α = .84).  
To examine whether partners with a better understanding of consumer finance wielded 
greater influence during the game, we measured participants’ Financial Confidence (FC; 
Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer 2014)
5
 at the end of the experiment. Each partner evaluated 
how characteristic five statements were of themselves (e.g., “I know the right questions to ask 
when making financial investment decisions” and “I have the skills required to make sound 
financial investments”; α = .91) on a 1-5 scale, where 1 = extremely uncharacteristic and 5 = 
extremely characteristic.  
Naturally, FC (a subjective measure of knowledge) is significantly correlated with 
objective measures of Financial Literacy (FL; r ≈ .30; Fernandes et al. 2014). We chose to 
measure FC as a proxy for expertise rather than FL for a few different reasons. First, measures of 
objective knowledge are necessarily constrained by the questions being asked. Individuals 
possess private information about their objective knowledge or skill that a scale may not 
incorporate into its evaluation. Confidence, therefore, may be a more all-encompassing, 
metacognitive indicator of actual financial acumen (cf. Hadar, Sood, and Fox 2013). Second, FC 
is likely to be more observable within couples than raw literacy. Partners may view each other’s 
FC as a signal of actual financial competence (e.g., Anderson et al. 2012; Fiske et al. 2002; Price 
and Stone 2004). Indeed, prior research has found that groups tend to follow the lead of their 
most confident members, regardless of actual accuracy (Zarnoth and Sniezek 1997). This pattern 
is particularly strong for intellective questions (e.g., math problems) versus judgmental questions 
                                                          
5
 This measure goes by two different names in Fernandes et al. (2014): “Consumer Confidence Investing” and 
“Consumer Confidence in Financial Information Search.” For simplicity, we refer to this measure as Financial 
Confidence. 
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(e.g., opinions, forecasts) because a correct solution is present in the former and can be readily 
communicated to partners (Laughlin 1980; Laughlin and Ellis 1986). The debt game is 
intellective in nature, thus we expect FC to be a strong predictor of social influence within 
couples. Third, beyond its signaling value, FC is likely to be strongly related to actual financial 
decision making competence. Research by Parker et al. (2012) has examined whether 
individuals’ confidence is related to the outcomes of self-reported and actual financial decisions. 
Across four studies with a national sample, the authors found that even after controlling for 
actual knowledge, greater confidence predicts (self-reported) planning for retirement and 
successfully minimizing fees on a hypothetical investment task. Specific to our purposes, prior 
work has also found that FC and perceived FL are more strongly related to measures of debt 
management than objective FL (e.g., paying off credit card balances in full and how banks and 
other financial institutions would rate one’s credit; Allgood and Walstad 2013; Fernandes et al. 
2014). Thus, we believe that FC is a close, appropriate proxy for objective financial knowledge 
(though we return to the distinction between FC and FL in a follow-up survey). 
After completing these post-game measures, couple members received payment (i.e., 
their show-up fee plus any earned incentive during the debt management game), were debriefed, 
and thanked for their time.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Couples concluded the game with significantly less debt than couple members working 
independently (M = $34,711, SD = $5,554 vs. M = $37,951, SD = $6,146; t(82) = 2.54, p = .01, d 
  
58 
 
= .56).
6
 Couples were also significantly less likely than individual couple members to completely 
pay off the four smallest debts (Debts 1-4) by the end of the game (21% vs. 43%; χ2 (1) = 4.42, p 
< .05). Staying focused on the two largest debts (Debts 5 and 6) is a sign of financial optimality 
(see figure 5); thus, these results indicate that couple members are less susceptible to DAA when 
working together. Note that any differences in game performance cannot be attributed to 
differences in overall task enjoyment or difficulty (ts(124) < 1). Couple members who worked 
together or independently evaluated their experiences similarly. 
 The multi-round nature of our data also allows us to examine how players’ strategies 
change over time. Couple members working together might be expected to show some form of 
turn-taking (Corfman and Lehman 1987), whereby couples try out one partner’s preferred 
strategy in one round, the other partner’s preferred strategy in the next round, and so on. To the 
extent that partners prefer somewhat different strategies, a turn-taking strategy should produce 
greater variance in couples’ strategies over time (relative to the variance in individuals’ strategies 
over time). However, if couples follow the lead of the member with greater financial expertise 
(or at least greater confidence in his or her expertise), we would not expect couples to display 
greater variance in their strategies over time.  
 Examining how strategies change over time is somewhat complicated by the fact that the 
game itself changes over time. For example, a purely debt account-averse player would pay off 
small debts early and then start chipping away at larger, high-interest debts later (see figure 6). 
This is not because the purely debt account-averse player changed strategies, but rather because 
there were no more small debts to pay off. To address this limitation, we focused on payments 
                                                          
6
 Note that individuals’ performance here closely matched individuals’ performance in prior, comparable conditions 
(e.g., individuals concluded the debt management game with $38,371 in total debt in the “No-Saving” condition of 
Amar et al.’s study 1). 
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toward the highest APR debt (Debt 6) across the first ten rounds. A financially optimal player 
would allocate all available cash to Debt 6 in the first ten rounds, and then use some of his or her 
available cash in Round 11 to pay off this debt. A purely debt account-averse player would not 
allocate any money to Debt 6 during the first ten rounds. Thus, behavior toward Debt 6 across 
the first ten rounds provides an opportunity to examine how strategies change over time, since 
the debt will be present for all players during those rounds, regardless of their strategy.  
 We examined how early repayments toward Debt 6 predicted the Round 10 repayment 
toward Debt 6. Specifically, for each condition, we computed nine correlations: the correlation 
between Round 1 repayments to Debt 6 and Round 10 repayments to Debt 6; the correlation 
between Round 2 repayments to Debt 6 and Round 10 repayments to Debt 6; and so on. 
Consistent with the notion that couples are following a leader, rather than taking turns, the 
variance among couples’ correlations is significantly smaller than the variance among 
individuals’ correlations (.01 vs. .06; F(1, 16) = 7.10, p < .05; see figure 7, panel A). Although 
there is clearly some exploration of different strategies in both conditions, couples appear to 
engage in less strategy-switching over time.  
 
The role of financial confidence (FC) in debt game performance. The preceding round-
by-round analysis is suggestive of a leadership role being taken by one member of the couple, 
but the relative stability of couples could conceivably be driven by other processes (e.g., 
compromising; cf. Gorlin and Dhar 2012). To gain more insight into couple members’ relative 
influence in the debt management game, we turn to an analysis of the role of financial 
confidence. Mean FC scores did not differ by condition (t(124) = 1.45, p = .15).  
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To assess partners’ relative influence in the game, we focused our analysis only on 
couples who completed the game together (N = 42). We took raw FC scores and designated the 
person with a higher FC score as the high expertise partner within the couple and the person with 
the lower FC score as the low expertise partner. In two separate regressions predicting final total 
debt, both the high expertise partner’s FC score (B = -3,947, t(40) = 4.31, p < .001) and the low 
expertise partner’s FC score (B = -2,974, t(40) = 3.73, p = .001) were significant, independent 
predictors of joint performance. However, if couples’ decision making benefits from following 
the lead of the financial expert within the relationship, we should observe the relative expert 
having greater influence on repayment decisions than the non-expert. The results from a multiple 
regression were consistent with this reasoning. When we regressed final total debt on both 
partners’ FC scores, we found a significant effect of the high expertise partner (B = -2,826, t(39) 
= 2.37, p < .05), but the effect of the low expertise partner was reduced to nonsignificance (B =   
-1,436, t(39) = 1.44, p = .16). Although the correlation between partners’ FC scores is high, 
(r(40) = .65, p < .001), multicollinearity is not cause for concern. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF; how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is “inflated” relative to a 
model where the predictor variables are uncorrelated) for this multiple regression is 1.74, and 
only values of 5-10 are problematic (cf. O’Brien 2007). 
 Next, we examined whether couples relied upon the high expertise partner early on in the 
game, or if his or her influence became evident only after several rounds. When we regressed 
total debt after five rounds on both partners’ FC scores, we find a significant effect of the high 
expertise partner (B = -216.58, t(39) = 3.33, p < .01), but not the low expertise partner (B =          
-38.65, t(39) < 1). Thus, the influence of the high expertise partner emerged early in the game, 
providing additional support for a “follow the leader” explanation.  
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 Follow-up survey conducted 10 months later. Thus far, we have demonstrated that 
couples make more optimal decisions together than individual couple members do alone. Two 
people working together effectively rely on the preferences of the high expertise partner (Zarnoth 
and Sniezek 1997). Of course, reverse-causality is a concern because we measured subjective FC 
after the debt game. It is possible that the person who had greater influence on debt repayment 
decisions gained greater confidence as the game progressed. To alleviate this concern, we sent an 
online, follow-up survey to all 63 couples 10 months after they completed the debt game in the 
lab (time 1). Seventy individuals responded (35 couples, all of whom indicated they were still 
together in a relationship), yielding a response rate of 56% (time 2). Eleven of the 35 couples 
completed the debt management game individually at time 1, while the remaining 24 couples 
completed the game together as a pair. To ensure that the “participating” couples were 
comparable to the “nonparticipating” couples, we compared their pre-screening measures (taken 
before the lab session at time 1 to confirm eligibility). Although participating couples were more 
likely to be married than nonparticipating couples (p < .05), we did not find any differences 
between the groups in partners’ ages (ps ≥ .68), general relationship happiness (ps ≥ .12), or 
relationship duration (p = .72). 
 The key dependent variable contained in the follow-up survey was FC scores (α = .92). 
Across the 70 individuals, the correlation between FC at time 1 and time 2 was significant (r(68) 
= .70, p < .001; the correlation remained strong among the 48 target individuals who completed 
the game with their partner, r(46) = .66, p < .001). These correlations indicate that time 1 results 
were not just informed by the game experience, as confidence appears to be stable over time.  
Among the 24 couples who completed the game together, we also examined whether FC 
scores at time 2 continued to predict game performance at time 1. We designated the person with 
  
62 
 
a higher FC score at time 2 as the high expertise partner and the person with the lower FC score 
at time 2 as the low expertise partner. In two separate regressions predicting final total debt at 
time 1, both partners’ FC scores at time 2 were significant predictors of joint performance (high 
FC: B = -3,554, t(22) = 3.00, p < .01; low FC: B = -2,322, t(22) = 2.22, p < .05). When the 
partners’ FC scores were entered simultaneously into a multiple regression, the high FC partner’s 
confidence predicts final total debt (B = -2,883, t(21) = 1.97, p = .06) but the low FC partner’s 
confidence does not (B = -954, t(21) < 1). The VIF factor in this model was within an acceptable 
range at 1.50. Thus, the high expertise partner’s score at time 2 is still marginally predictive of 
the couple’s performance at time 1.  
In addition to measuring FC scores at time 2, we measured financial literacy (FL) and 
general self-control. First, to examine whether “objective” financial knowledge is a stronger 
predictor of debt game performance than “subjective” knowledge, we included a 13-item 
measure of FL after the FC measures (Fernandes et al. 2014). Each question (e.g., “Normally, 
which asset described below displays the highest fluctuations over time?”) has one correct 
answer (e.g., stocks). We summed the number of items each individual answered correctly to 
form his or her total score.  
Consistent with prior research (Fernandes et al. 2014), FL was significantly correlated 
with FC scores at both time 1 (r(68) = .28, p < .05) and time 2 (r(68) = .25, p < .05). These 
positive values represent a certain “degree of metacognitive competence” (Parker et al. 2012, 
387). As our focus is on understanding couples’ decision making, we next tested the relative 
influence of each partner’s objective and subjective financial expertise in predicting debt 
repayment decisions. Specifically, we ran three regression models using time 2 measures of FC 
and FL to predict final total debt at time 1 (see table 3). These analyses were conducted among 
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the 24 couples who were originally assigned to the Couple condition at time 1. We designated 
the person with the higher FC score as the high subjective expertise partner within the couple and 
the person with the lower FC score as the low subjective expertise partner. Likewise, the person 
with the higher FL score served as the high objective expertise partner and the person with the 
lower FL score served as the low objective expertise partner. The results revealed that while the 
high FC partner drives joint decision making (model 1), FL measures do not predict the couples’ 
performance (model 2). When we regressed final total debt on all four measures of expertise, we 
found a significant effect only for the high FC partner (B = -3569, t(19) = 2.51, p < .05; model 
3). These results speak to the predictive power of subjective financial knowledge over and above 
objective financial knowledge (Parker et al. 2012). 
Lastly, one could argue that resisting the urge to close small debt accounts requires a 
certain degree of restraint. One prior study found that married couples tend to accommodate the 
preferences of the low self-control (vs. high self-control) partner when faced with a hypothetical 
financial decision (Dzhogleva and Lamberton 2014; study 2B). Our results thus far are 
inconsistent with a self-control explanation because our couples are following the lead of the 
higher (vs. lower) expertise partner. In any case, we addressed this possibility with a final set of 
analyses among the 24 couples assigned to the Couple condition at time 1. Each individual 
completed the 13-item Brief Self-Control measure (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 2004), 
which contains statements like “I am good at resisting temptation” and “People would say that I 
have iron self-discipline.” Participants rated how well each item described themselves along 1-7 
scales where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much (α = .85). Within each couple, one partner was 
designated as the high self-control partner and the other was designated as the low self-control 
partner. Whether the partners’ scores were assessed as independent or simultaneous predictors of 
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couples’ final total debt, general self-control measures were not significant predictors of 
performance (all ps ≥ .11). A final analysis tested whether a tendency toward DAA is related to 
general self-control. Among individuals who completed the game independently, general self-
control did not predict debt game performance (r(20) = -.07, p = .77). Taken together, these 
results do not support a self-control explanation for couples’ debt repayment decisions.  
 
Summary of results. The results of experiment 1 indicate that couples make more optimal 
debt repayment decisions when working together versus alone. Couples benefitted from placing 
greater weight on the preferences of the partner with greater financial expertise. The follow-up 
survey provides evidence against reverse-causality and highlights the advantages of measuring 
FC (a measure of subjective knowledge) over FL (objective knowledge). Specifically, final total 
debt at time 1 could be predicted by measures of FC but not by measures of FL (both of which 
were measured at time 2).  
 
EXPERIMENT 2: DO ALL PAIRS BENEFIT FROM DELIBERATION?  
 
Experiment 1 speaks to the power of established couples making financial decisions 
jointly versus individually. Yet, two possible explanations for this pattern of results exist. First, 
couples might benefit from identifying and empowering the partner with higher financial 
expertise. Second, couples may simply benefit from deliberation, which would facilitate deeper 
thought and consideration of repayment strategies. Experiment 2 examines these competing 
explanations by presenting the debt management game to pairs of strangers. Like couples, 
stranger-pairs should benefit from talking through repayment decisions (i.e., greater 
  
65 
 
deliberation). Without track records or a history of experiences, however, stranger-pairs may find 
it difficult to determine who has greater financial expertise. Having minimal information about 
one another could result in the less knowledgeable partner having too much influence over joint 
decisions. We examined these possibilities in the following experiment. 
 
Participants and Procedure  
 
Eighty-seven members of a paid subject pool (age range: 18-23, Mage = 20; 64% female) 
were recruited to participate in the experiment. Each participant received a $5 show-up fee plus 
anything they earned during the experiment. Specially, they could each earn up to $7.50 based 
upon game performance: they received $7.50 if their total debt was less than $30,000, $5 if their 
total debt was between $30,001 and $35,000, $2.50 if their total debt was between $35,001 and 
$40,000, and $0 if their total debt was greater than $40,000. These amounts were per individual, 
so two people playing the game together could earn up to $15 between the two of them.  
Many of the procedures were identical to those used in experiment 1. After participants 
received instructions for the game and asked any questions, they were randomly assigned by 
session to complete the game individually (N = 47) or with a partner (N = 40). Participants in the 
Individual condition completed the game individually at private computer workstations. They 
were asked not to communicate with others during the experiment. Participants in the Stranger-
Pair condition completed the game with a partner at one person’s computer workstation. They 
were encouraged to communicate with each other during the experiment, as they would be 
making decisions as a pair. Following the game, participants in the Stranger-Pair condition 
returned to individual workstations where everyone proceeded to answer a few questions 
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(independently) about their experience during the game and demographic questions. Participants 
completed the Enjoyment index (α = .87) and Difficulty index (α = .73) used in experiment 1, 
which were measured using shorter 1-7 scales, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much. 
Participants also completed the five-item FC index (α = .87) to examine each partner’s relative 
influence in predicting final total debt. Participants in the Stranger-Pair condition confirmed that 
they were previously unacquainted with their partner (this was true for all of them). After 
completing these follow-up measures, individuals received payment (i.e., their show-up fee plus 
any earned incentive), were debriefed, and thanked for their time.  
 
Results and Discussion  
 
Stranger-pairs concluded the game with significantly more debt than individuals (M = 
$39,701, SD = $4,415 vs. M = $37,134, SD = $4,792; t(65) = 2.05, p < .05, d = .56). (Note that 
individuals in experiment 2 performed comparably to individual couple members in experiment 
1; t(87) < 1). Among the 20 stranger-pairs, we did not observe a difference in performance 
between the 9 mixed-sex pairs and 11 same-sex pairs (p = .84). Stranger-pairs were also 
significantly more likely than individuals to pay off the four smallest debts (Debts 1-4) by the 
end of the game (70% vs. 32%; χ2 (1) = 8.29, p < .01). Like experiment 1, differences in game 
performance cannot be explained by differences in task enjoyment or difficulty (ts(84) ≤ 1.00, ps 
≥ .32). Unlike experiment 1, however, these results are conceptually consistent with prior work 
suggesting that deliberation makes individual biases more pronounced (Schkade et al. 2007).  
In experiment 1, we found relatively greater variability in individual couple members’ 
repayment behavior than couples’ repayment behavior. Couples benefit from transactive memory 
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systems (e.g., Wegner 1986), such that they are able to identify who has greater financial 
expertise within the partnership and allocate decision making responsibility accordingly. 
However, strangers working together may have difficulty in identifying who has relevant 
expertise, resulting in a high degree of variability across rounds. We examined variability using a 
similar approach to that used in experiment 1: correlating repayment to Debt 6 in Rounds 1-9 
with repayment to this account in Round 10. Levene’s test indicated an equal amount of variance 
between stranger-pairs and individuals (.08 vs. .04; F(1, 16) = 1.34, p = .26; see figure 7, panel 
B). Thus, there was an equal amount of variation in both conditions. If we compare these results 
to those obtained in experiment 1, we see that individuals in both experiments had similar levels 
of variability (.06 vs. .04; F(1, 16) < 1), but that strangers-pairs had significantly more variation 
in their strategy than established couples (.08 vs. .01; F(1, 16) = 9.96, p < .01). 
 
The role of financial confidence (FC) in debt game performance. We next examined the 
predictive power of FC scores, which did not differ by condition (t(84) = 1.47, p = .15). Similar 
to experiment 1, we focused only on the stranger-pairs (N = 20) to test each partner’s relative 
influence on joint performance. The person with the higher FC score was designated as the high 
expertise partner and the person with the lower FC score was designated as the low expertise 
partner. In two separate regressions predicting final total debt, both the high expertise partner’s 
FC score (B = -4,253, t(18) = 2.73, p = . 01) and the low expertise partner’s FC score (B =           
-3,357, t(18) = 2.89, p = .01) are significant, independent predictors of joint performance. When 
these two variables are entered simultaneously into a multiple regression, however, one partner 
does not have greater predictive power over the other (low expertise: B = -2,236, t(17) = 1.60, p 
= .13; high expertise: B = -2,544, t(17) = 1.39, p = .18). The VIF factor in this model was within 
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an acceptable range at 1.51. Thus, it appears that the high and low expertise individuals exert 
equal influence, which ultimately resulted in suboptimal performance.  
One could argue that the high/low FC dynamics we observed in experiment 2 are 
different from those observed in experiment 1 because of smaller FC differences between 
partners. Not only are younger consumers less experienced with financial matters, they have had 
less time to develop clearly differentiated financial roles (cf. Ward and Lynch 2015). Among 
established couples, the more confident partner might be highly confident during interactions, 
while the less confident partner might be highly timid. Such gaps may be nonexistent among 
younger stranger-pairs whose partners may be relatively comparable in skill. To address this 
possibility, we compared partners’ FC scores between the two experiments. The results reveal 
that the average FC score of the high expertise partner was significantly higher in experiment 1 
than experiment 2 (M = 3.72, SD = .79 vs. M = 3.05, SD = .56; t(60) = 3.41, p = .001, d = .94). 
Likewise, the average FC score of the low expertise partner was significantly higher in 
experiment 1 than experiment 2 (M = 2.85, SD = .95 vs. M = 2.18, SD = .74; t(60) = 2.77, p < 
.01, d = .76). However, the mean discrepancy between the two partners was identical in the two 
experiments (M = .88, SD = .74 vs. M = .87, SD = .62; t(60) < 1). Although the older, established 
couples are generally more confident than the younger stranger-pairs (i.e., there are different 
absolute levels of confidence between experiments), divergence between partners cannot explain 
the differential influence in decision making. One final piece of evidence against this explanation 
lies in the comparison between individuals in each experiment. The correlation between FC 
scores and final total debt among participants working independently was similar in magnitude 
(rExp1 = -.48 vs. rExp2 = -.41; z < 1), suggesting that FC is operating in the same way.  
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Summary of results. Overall, the results of experiment 2 suggest that established couples 
do not benefit from deliberation alone. In contrast to couples who make more optimal debt 
repayment decisions together than apart (experiment 1), stranger-pairs make less optimal 
decisions together than apart. In order to minimize final total debt, pairs should follow the lead of 
the high expertise individual. The results from experiment 2 indicate that stranger-pairs are 
unable to effectively allocate financial decision making responsibility. Both partners influence 
joint decisions, but neither exerts stronger influence over the other. One reason this may be the 
case is because unacquainted partners have insufficient knowledge of each other’s financial 
expertise. If strangers are unable to identify who has a deeper understanding of consumer 
finance, then they are unlikely to rely on the relative expert. In the next experiment, we provide 
stranger-pairs an opportunity to learn about each other’s financial acumen before completing the 
debt management game. We predicted that stranger-pairs who are more accurate in their 
inferences of relative expertise should make more optimal repayment decisions as a team. 
Although we recruited stranger-pairs in experiments 2 and 3, the ultimate goal of our 
research is to aid couples’ decision making. On average, couples follow the lead of the higher 
expertise partner (experiment 1), but surely some couple members are more informed about each 
other’s FC than others. Some couples may truly avoid discussing financial matters before or even 
after marriage, perhaps in anticipation of disagreements. Thus, our next experiment examines 
whether a simple discussion surrounding personal finance can improve partners’ ability to 
evaluate each other’s FC and ultimately nudge partners toward more optimal decision making. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3: LEARNING ABOUT EACH OTHER’S FINANCIAL EXPERTISE  
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The results from experiment 2 indicate that interpersonal deliberation alone does not 
predict optimal debt repayment behavior. Arguably, established couples perform better because 
they can identify and empower the partner with stronger financial knowledge. Stranger-pairs 
may not be able to discern each other’s relative expertise because they have had little to no 
previous, relevant interaction (i.e., opportunities for financial discussions). In experiment 3, we 
examined whether an initial discussion about money can help strangers identify the partner with 
higher expertise, and ultimately influence decision making.  
As our focus is on helping couples, note that this design is analogous to the church 
recommendation (or requirement in some faiths) to engage in a premarital discussion about 
money before marriage. For example, the Catholic Church identifies finances as a “must-have 
conversation” (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2015). 
 
Participants and Procedure  
 
A total of 100 undergraduates (age range: 18-26, Mage = 20; 49% female) at a large 
Midwestern university participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. Upon 
arriving to the lab, participants were told that researchers were interested in trivia knowledge. 
The researchers had ostensibly created a pool of questions for an upcoming event and needed to 
test a few of them out on local students. Participants were told that they would complete three 
different sets of questions before moving on to the next task. No feedback on accuracy was 
provided during the experiment, but they could elect to see their scores at the end of the session. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two trivia conditions. Those in the 
Financial Familiarity condition (N = 50) first completed five University of Michigan trivia 
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questions independently, followed by five financial literacy questions independently (adapted 
from Fernandes et al. 2014; see appendix 4). They were then paired with an unacquainted 
stranger nearby for a final set of five financial literacy questions. They were encouraged to 
discuss the questions with their partner before they each answered the items on their separate 
computers. Participants who were assigned to the Control condition (N = 50) initially completed 
all ten financial literacy questions on their own. They were then paired with an unacquainted 
stranger nearby for a final set of five University of Michigan questions. Note that everyone was 
exposed to the same questions (i.e., everyone was “mentally stimulated” to the same extent and 
in the same way) and that all stranger-pairs had the opportunity to interact before the game.  
Everyone then moved on to the debt management game. After receiving instructions, they 
were told that they would be completing the game with their original trivia partner, i.e., the 
person with whom they completed the first task. They were encouraged to communicate with 
their partner during the experiment because all decisions would be made as a pair. The game was 
incentive-compatible such that each partner could earn a bonus depending upon their joint 
performance. Specifically, they each received $10 if their total debt was less than $30,000, $7.50 
if their total debt was between $30,001 and $35,000, $5 if their total debt was between $35,001 
and $40,000, and $0 if their total debt was greater than $40,000.  
Following the game, participants returned to individual workstations where everyone 
proceeded to answer a few questions independently. Participants completed the FC scale used 
previously (α = .90). They then assessed their partner’s financial confidence. Specifically, we 
reworded each of the five FC scale items so they referred to one’s partner. For example, the FC 
item “I am confident in my ability to recognize a good financial investment” became “My 
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partner is confident in his or her ability to recognize a good financial investment.” This measure 
of partners’ perceived financial confidence (pFC) had good internal consistency (α = .90).  
After completing these follow-up measures and confirming they did not previously know 
their partners, individuals received payment (i.e., their earned incentive), were debriefed, and 
thanked for their time.  
 
Results and Discussion  
 
We focused our analyses on two central questions. First, did the Financial Familiarity 
intervention improve participants’ ability to perceive their partner’s financial confidence? 
Second, did a better understanding of each other’s financial confidence improve performance in 
the debt management game?   
 
Understanding each other’s financial confidence (FC). We created an FC Inaccuracy 
index to capture how inaccurate participants were in their perceptions of their partner’s financial 
confidence. Specifically, the FC Inaccuracy index took the following form: 
| Partner 1’s FC – Partner 2’s pFC | + | Partner 2’s FC – Partner 1’s pFC | 
In other words, we (1) took the absolute value of the discrepancy between one partner’s FC score 
and how the other perceived him/her and (2) summed the two discrepancy scores together. 
As predicted, stranger-pairs in the Financial Familiarity condition had significantly lower 
inaccuracy scores than those in the Control condition (M = 1.38, SD = .58 vs. M = 1.85, SD = 
1.03; t(48) = 1.99, p = .05, d = .58). In other words, having the opportunity to discuss finances 
before the debt management game reduced inaccuracy in perceptions of each other’s FC.  
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Predicting debt game performance from FC inaccuracy. To examine the influence of FC 
inaccuracy on debt game performance, we regressed final total debt on the Inaccuracy index. The 
results revealed a significant relationship such that greater inaccuracy predicted greater debt (B = 
2708, t(48) = 3.48, p = .001). Note that the strength of this relationship did not differ by trivia 
condition (z = .62, p = .54).  
We next tested whether inaccurate inferences about partners’ FC mediated the 
relationship between financial familiarity and debt game performance (model 4 in Hayes 2013; 
see figure 8). As noted earlier, there was a significant main effect of trivia condition on 
inaccuracy (financial familiarity = +.5, control = -.5; B = -.47, t(48) = 1.99, p = .05). Strangers 
who discussed finances instead of University of Michigan trivia were less inaccurate in their 
perceptions and, in turn, reduced inaccuracy was associated with lower final total debt (B = 
2706, t(47) = 3.30, p < .01). Further, the indirect effect of trivia condition on final total debt was 
significant (B- 95% CI: -3012, -134), providing evidence of mediation. Note that this is 
an indirect-only mediation, as the trivia manipulation did not significantly affect debt game 
performance (path c: B = -1292, t(48) < 1). This null effect is not problematic for our theorizing, 
however, as having a direct effect between the independent variable and dependent variable is 
not a necessary requirement for establishing mediation (Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010). Our 
results indicate that the trivia manipulation operated by enhancing partners’ ability to detect each 
other’s FC, which then enhanced the optimality of debt repayment decisions.  
A possible alternative account for the relationship between FC Inaccuracy and total debt 
is that pairs with greater FC Inaccuracy are generally less competent. That is, perhaps partners 
that are less capable of perceiving each other’s FC are generally less capable across domains. To 
address this possibility, we examined the correlations between inaccuracy and mean FC in the 
  
74 
 
pairs (r(48) = -.34, p < .05), the pairs’ mean performance on the first set of financial literacy 
questions (r(48) = -.07, p = .64), and the pairs’ mean performance on the second set of financial 
literacy questions (r(48) = -.10, p = .50). These results indicate that inaccuracy is significantly 
related to the pairs’ average level of FC (i.e., weaker confidence is related to greater inaccuracy), 
but unrelated to objective financial knowledge. When we entered the four variables (i.e., FC 
inaccuracy, mean FC within the pair, the first set of financial literacy questions, and the second 
set of financial literacy questions) into a multiple regression predicting final total debt, FC 
inaccuracy is the only significant predictor of performance (B = 2222, t(45) = 2.79, p < .01).  
Lastly, it is worth noting that FC Inaccuracy is likely not capturing blame. Surely, after 
pairs perform poorly, there is some blame attributed to oneself and some blame attributed to 
one’s partner. Those attributions would themselves be interesting to examine in this context (cf. 
Anand and Stern 1985). However, given that partners were assessing their own and their 
partner’s financial confidence, rather than raw financial skills, it is unlikely that inflated FC 
Inaccuracy scores are driven by partners blaming each other for poor performance. 
 
Summary of results. Couples are often encouraged to discuss money before getting 
married. The Catholic Church, for example, requires engaged couples to engage in these 
discussions shortly before their wedding (in “Pre-Cana” classes). Experiment 3 suggests that 
these discussions may be quite beneficial. We demonstrated that jointly answering financial quiz 
questions can help partners understand each other’s financial confidence, which in turn helps 
them jointly navigate financial decisions. In fact, partners’ ability to identify each other’s 
financial confidence was more predictive of their debt management game performance than their 
mean levels of financial confidence and financial literacy. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The average indebted American household owes $15,609 in credit card debt, $32,956 in 
student loans, and $156,706 on their mortgage (Chen 2015). Relatedly, the typical credit card 
holder has an average of 3.7 cards (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 2011), a number that is 
above and beyond other non-revolving debts like student loans and mortgages. Thus, many 
families are juggling multiple debt accounts with different balances and interest rates. 
Consumers are also subjected to conflicting advice on how best to manage those debts. While 
some financial authors like Dave Ramsey (2009) advocate paying off the smallest accounts in 
ascending order (i.e., the snowball method), others like Suze Orman (2015) suggest paying off 
the highest interest rate accounts in descending order (i.e., the mathematically optimal method). 
These challenges are compounded when debt is jointly held, as repayment decisions often invite 
input from all indebted parties. Our research challenges the generalizability of debt management 
research conducted among individuals by examining how pairs of individuals—ranging from 
established couples to strangers—navigate these decisions.  
Consumer research conducted among dyads has gained recent attention in the marketing 
literature (Gorlin and Dhar 2012; Simpson, Griskevicius, and Rothman 2012), emphasizing the 
importance of other people in shaping one’s decision making. One domain where interpersonal 
influence is particularly relevant is consumer financial decision making (Lynch 2011). Couples 
face a myriad of financial decisions ranging from choosing mortgages, building an investment 
portfolio, saving for children’s education or retirement, and managing debt accounts. Although 
some earlier work has considered couples’ decision making, this research generally focuses on 
product evaluation and choice rather than financial decisions per se (e.g., Corfman and Lehmann 
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1987; Davis, Hoch, and Ragsdale 1986; Ferber and Lee 1974; Filiatrault and Ritchie 1980; Su, 
Fern, and Ye 2003). In contrast, the present research examines debt management using 
performance-based incentives, linking actual decisions to real monetary outcomes and featuring 
a clear normative benchmark for decision making. Offering this type of incentive structure is a 
better approximation to reality, as financial decisions often have real financial consequences.  
In a series of three experiments, we find that deliberation can help dyads, but only in the 
context of an existing relationship. Romantic couples make more financially optimal decisions 
when working together than when working independently (experiment 1). Couples are less 
susceptible to DAA than individual couple members, presumably because they allow the high 
expertise partner to guide joint decisions. This influence occurs early on in the debt management 
game, which results in a less variable repayment strategy. The results from a follow-up survey 
yielded similar insights: the relatively high expertise partner’s influence continued to predict 
joint performance 10 months later. Importantly, a subjective measure of financial expertise (i.e., 
FC scores; Fernandes et al. 2014) was a significant predictor of game performance, while an 
objective measure of FL was not. Rather than partners’ different levels of general self-control 
driving performance (Dzhogleva and Lamberton 2014), established couples’ decision making is 
driven by the ability to identify and empower the partner with greater financial expertise. 
Unlike established couples, strangers lack transactive memory systems (Ward and Lynch 
2015; Wegner 1986; Wegner et al. 1991; Wegner et al. 1985). The results show that stranger-
pairs perform significantly worse than individuals because they are unable to effectively divide 
responsibility between themselves (experiment 2). We find that stranger-pairs do not follow the 
preferences of one partner any more than the other partner, which creates variability in 
repayment strategy. Fortunately, stranger-pairs are not doomed to experience suboptimal 
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outcomes in every context. Allowing partners to discuss finances before introducing the debt 
repayment task enhanced their ability to identify each other’s expertise. The results from a 
mediation analysis indicated that greater accuracy in knowledge inferences was what ultimately 
improved performance.   
When researching heterosexual couples, one must consider the potential role of gender 
dynamics in shaping decision outcomes. Gender is particularly relevant for financial decisions as 
previous research has found that females, on average, are generally less financially confident and 
knowledgeable than males (e.g., Chen and Volpe 2002; Fernandes et al. 2014). The results from 
experiment 1 are consistent with this gender pattern such that male individuals reported higher 
mean FC scores than female individuals (M = 3.46, SD = .92 vs. M = 2.92, SD = 1.04, t(124) = 
3.09, p < .01, d = .55). Males in the follow-up survey also had significantly higher FL scores 
than females (M = 10.71, SD = 1.30 vs. M = 8.60, SD = 3.17, t(68) = 3.65, p = .001, d = .88). 
Given these mean differences, it is possible that female partners simply default to their male 
counterparts during financial decision making. One implication of a gender explanation is that 
heterosexual couples should perform no better than opposite-sex stranger-pairs. We do not find 
this to be the case: couples in experiment 1 ended the game with significantly lower debt than 
opposite-sex pairs in experiment 2 (M = $34,711, SD = $5,554 vs. M = $39,466, SD = $4,329; 
t(49) = 2.41, p < .05, d = .90) and marginally lower debt than opposite-sex pairs in experiment 3 
(M = $36,793, SD = $5,326; t(79) = 1.72, p = .09, d = .39). Thus, it seems unlikely that gender 
effects alone can explain our results.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
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Several open questions pertaining to dyadic consumer financial decision making remain. 
For instance, we find that lower expertise couple members benefit from working with higher 
expertise couple members in the moment. We do not yet know whether the lower expertise 
individuals learn to behave more optimally as a function of the interaction. According to social 
learning theory (Bandura 1977), people learn through observing, imitating, and modeling others’ 
behaviors. If a low expertise partner witnesses his or her high expertise partner making optimal 
decisions, then the former may successfully replicate this strategy in a subsequent task. 
Unfortunately, learning new information does not always translate to new behaviors, as one must 
be sufficiently motivated to imitate the behavior being modeled (Bandura 1977). There may be 
little incentive for a low expertise partner to learn wise financial management if the couple (by 
default) relies upon the high expertise partner. Rather than developing shared expertise in the 
same domain, the couple may non/consciously designate one partner as the financial expert (Ward 
and Lynch 2015) and outsource all relevant responsibilities. Understanding when and why 
couples prefer to outsource responsibility is a matter warranting further study.  
Future research might also consider the external validity of our experimental paradigm. 
Are couples efficiently managing and allocating debt repayment responsibilities outside of the 
lab? In our experiments, we find that high expertise couple members take more control during the 
debt management game, which predicts more optimal behavior. We may observe different 
dynamics outside of the lab where financial decisions happen in a less structured environment. It 
is possible that high expertise partners excel in other areas (e.g., earning potential), resulting in the 
low expertise partner managing day-to-day bills. If so, our experiments would be overstating the 
extent to which couples get these sorts of decisions “right.”  
  
79 
 
Another consideration is that there is some negative affect associated with debt that 
couple members help to minimize. Juggling multiple debt accounts with different sizes and 
interest rates may be experienced as stressful, so having a partner with whom to share the burden 
may prove helpful. Future research might examine whether similar dynamics would be observed 
among couples facing less negative financial decisions than debt repayment (e.g., choosing 
among exotic vacation destinations). Moreover, different types of debt may elicit different 
emotions among payees. Allocating money toward paying down a neutral car loan is likely to be 
different than paying down a hedonic debt like designer clothing financed through credit cards.  
Qualities about the couples themselves could also shape their decision making. Factors 
like previous relationship experiences, household income, education, and credit card usage could 
all feasibly have an impact. Our sample was relatively homogenous in terms of demographic 
variables. For instance, 71% reported having a minimum of a four-year Bachelor’s degree and 
another 16% reported being currently enrolled in higher education. They also reported being 
significantly above average in terms of current socioeconomic status (e.g., they generally agreed 
with statements like “I don’t worry too much about paying my bills”; Griskevicius et al. 2010). 
We may observe different patterns of results among couples with limited means, where it may be 
perfectly “rational” to focus on feeding their family rather than minimizing debt. Recent research 
indicates that experiencing financial strain taxes cognitive resources, leaving the poor less able to 
cope with life’s demands, often resulting in poor financial decision making (e.g., pawning items, 
taking out more loans; Mani et al. 2013). Thus, lower-income couples may find it difficult to 
avoid DAA and other suboptimal financial biases. Understanding the unique circumstances 
facing couples (and how they contribute to financial decision making) will be critical for 
advancing consumer welfare.   
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 Deliberations over how to handle debt often extend beyond couples (e.g., businesses, 
Congress). Thus, future research might consider whether or not the results generalize to other 
types of social interaction (i.e., interactions where “majority rules” and alliances are possible; 
Moreland 2010). As an initial step in this direction, we added sessions to experiment 2 where 25 
groups of three previously unacquainted individuals completed the debt management game (age 
range: 18-23, Mage = 20.1; 78% female). Planned contrasts revealed that performance among 
groups was virtually identical to that among stranger-pairs. Specifically, groups ended the game 
with significantly more debt than individuals (M = $39,498, SD = $5,191 vs. M = $37,134, SD = 
$4,792; t(89) = 1.98, p = .05, d = .49), but a similar amount of debt to stranger-pairs (M = 
$39,498, SD = $5,191 vs. M = $39,701, SD = $4,415; t(89) < 1). Groups’ suboptimal 
performance appears to be driven by a tendency to pay off the four smallest debt accounts. 
Groups were significantly more likely than individuals to pay off the very smallest accounts 
(64% vs. 32%; χ2 (1) = 6.85, p = .009) but just as likely as stranger-pairs (64% vs. 70%; χ2 (1) < 
1). In sum, comparable results among stranger-pairs and groups suggest that deliberation outside 
of preexisting relationships may intensify DAA. Future work might investigate whether non-
romantic pairs or groups of people with previous knowledge of each other (e.g., platonic friends, 
family members) exhibit similar, suboptimal behavior.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Our results contribute to a growing body of literature exploring the interplay between 
interpersonal relationships and decision making processes (Joel, MacDonald, and Plaks 2013; 
Gorlin and Dhar 2012; Simpson et al. 2012). Building upon prior research in debt management 
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(Amar et al. 2011), we examined whether and why common biases observed among individuals 
generalize to romantic couples. We find that couple members working together are less 
susceptible to DAA than couple members working on their own. Conversely, stranger-pairs 
performed significantly worse than individuals, highlighting the crucial role of inferred financial 
competence. While couples are able to assess each other’s relative expertise, stranger-pairs lack 
information about each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Completing a simple “warm-up” 
exercise improved unacquainted partners’ ability to infer one another’s competence, which 
ultimately led to more optimal debt management decisions. In sum, we would agree with the 
wisdom from many churches (e.g., Ashton 2006; Burkett 2002; United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops 2015)—couples would do well by discussing finances openly and making 
decisions together.   
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CHAPTER IV  
Discussion 
 
This dissertation examines the bidirectional relationship between social influence and 
financial decisions. Decisions regarding mortgages, investments, credit cards, and auto loans 
very frequently happen in concert with close others. In two essays, I have demonstrated that 
financial decisions influence the development of relationships (Essay 1) and relationship 
dynamics influence financial decisions (Essay 2). Thus, my dissertation provides a more 
complete understanding of consumer financial decision making by applying an interpersonal lens 
to fundamental, consequential consumption behavior.  
The end of each essay contains a discussion of theoretical contributions and future 
directions. That being said, I would like to reiterate a few key findings and why they are 
important. First, my work represents (to the best of my knowledge) the first empirical 
investigation to explicitly focus on the appeal of saving and resource conservation in romantic 
relationships (Essay 1). Conventional wisdom and previous research from an evolutionary 
perspective would argue that spending money is a successful means of attracting mates (e.g., 
Griskevicius et al. 2007; Sundie et al. 2011). This literature proposes that outward displays of 
wealth serve as “honest” signals that one has abundant resources and, thus, spenders should be 
viewed as more desirable than savers. Spending money is easy to detect (i.e., the signal is clearly 
visible) and conveys information about future resource potential. Note that evolutionary 
hypotheses are gender-specific and revolve around males’ financial resources and women’s 
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reproductive capacity (e.g., Buss, 1989; Buss and Schmitt 1993; Li et al. 2002; Li and Kenrick 
2006). Thus, evolutionary psychology would predict that females prefer a mate with resources, 
which could be a spender (evident via viable displays) or a saver (evident through a sizable bank 
account). In contrast to this reasoning, my central prediction is that both males and females 
prefer savers over spenders because of general self-control (above and beyond financial 
viability). Indeed, in a series of experiments, I find that people who chronically save are viewed 
as more attractive than people who chronically spend. Both males and females view savers as 
possessing greater general self-control than spenders, and perceived self-control increases 
savers’ romantic and physical appeal. Additionally, I demonstrate that being a saver does have 
signaling value. Individuals are able to accurately detect others’ general financial habits simply 
by glancing at their outward appearance. A final distinction between evolutionary psychology 
and my own work is the area of emphasis: while evolutionary psychology generally focuses on 
how reproductive motives influence consumption, I am interested in the inferences people draw 
from others’ consumption. 
The results from Essay 1 highlight that saving not only has direct financial benefits, but 
also relational benefits. Admittedly, not everyone is motivated or able to save money judiciously, 
and so many individuals experience significant debt (perhaps in an unsuccessful attempt to 
attract romantic partners). Recent work has investigated how individuals manage debt (e.g., 
Amar et al. 2011), but when debt is jointly held, repayment decisions often invite input from all 
indebted parties. Thus, my dissertation considers whether and why common decision making 
biases observed among individuals generalize to romantic couples (Essay 2). When individuals 
must choose between paying off a small debt and chipping away at a larger debt with a larger 
interest rate, they tend to pay off the small debt, a costly tendency known as debt account 
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aversion. I find that established couples are better off making repayment decisions together than 
on their own. Couples benefit not only from deliberation, but from placing greater weight on the 
preferences of the partner with greater financial expertise. Perceived competence does not 
enhance decision making among pairs of strangers who, presumably, lack the shared history 
necessary to draw accurate inferences about each other’s capabilities.  
Taken together, this research suggests a variety of future directions for research projects, 
some of which are already underway. Of primary interest is building a bridge between Essays 1 
(relationship formation) and 2 (after existing couples are in the “red”). Chronic saving and 
spending habits not only influence initial attraction, but also relationship quality post-courtship, 
particularly if couple members’ habits differ (Rick, Small, and Finkel 2011). How couples 
structure their financial accounts (e.g., purely joint or purely separate) may ameliorate or 
exacerbate the financial and psychological effects of differences in partners’ natural spending 
habits. Despite its potential importance, the decision of whether or not to merge accounts is one 
that many couples struggle with, as conflicting views are rampant. Prior correlational work 
suggests that married couples who pool their money in joint accounts tend to be happier than 
couples who maintain separate accounts (Addo and Sassler 2010; Kenney 2006). Yet, it is 
unclear whether maintaining joint accounts actually improves marital quality or whether 
particularly happy couples are simply more likely to open joint accounts. 
 Different money management systems within relationships may have implications for 
certain types of “unethical” behavior. One area I am particularly interested in exploring is the 
notion of “financial infidelity,” which exists when partners are not forthcoming about monetary 
decisions. Such behavior can manifest as concealing assets and debts; lying about how much 
money is earned, spent, saved, or borrowed; excessive gambling; and/or maintaining private 
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bank accounts. Descriptively, there are numerous popular press articles, self-help books, and 
surveys establishing the existence of financial infidelity (e.g., Goudreau 2011; Elliott, Eccles, 
and Gournay 1996; Junare and Patel 2012; Marte 2015; Mecia 2015; Weil 2008). What the 
existing literature lacks is rigorous experimental work examining the motivations, mechanisms, 
and consequences. Related to money management systems, financial infidelity might be more 
likely with separate versus joint bank accounts where partners cannot monitor each other’s 
spending as easily. Interestingly, the accountability that comes with joint bank accounts might 
actually encourage deceptive behavior (e.g., “I want my partner to think I’m being ‘good,’ so I’m 
going to hide this splurge”). Financial infidelity within romantic relationships could also lead to 
compensatory reactions as a way of regaining control. For example, imagine a scenario where a 
wife stumbles upon her husband’s secretive spending. His depletion of their shared resources 
threatens her spending (not to mention other outcomes like trust and intimacy), which could lead 
to her spending more out of spite (“revenge spending”; cf. Brehm 1966). Relatedly, if a saver 
wife pushes her stringent financial goals on a spender husband, he may continue to overspend to 
assert his independence (cf. Chartrand, Dalton, and Fitzsimons 2007).  
A final area of future research focuses on the development of saving and spending habits 
across the lifespan. Specifically, I began a project this past term assessing the relationships 
between parents’ and adult children’s spending habits, with an eye toward gaining insight into 
the transmission of financial values within families. I focus on young adults because they face 
the key developmental milestone of economic independence (Arnett 2000). The late teens and 
early twenties are a time when many individuals “leave the nest” and become self-sufficient. 
Understanding the financial habits of this segment is important, as young adults have a spending 
power of over $200 billion a year (Schawbel 2015). These individuals, however, do not enter the 
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marketplace as blank slates. Parents play a key role in the development of their children’s 
monetary attitudes and outcomes (e.g., Clarke et al. 2005; Danes 1994; Gudmunson and Danes 
2011). Despite some interest in understanding intrahousehold financial relationships, previous 
research has focused on adolescents (e.g., Furnham 1999), college students (e.g., Jorgensen and 
Savla 2010; Shim et al. 2010), or adults’ memories of childhood (e.g. Cho et al. 2012; Furnham, 
von Stumm, and Milner 2014), rather than on parents’ reports. Thus, one contribution of my 
work is surveying all three family members (i.e., the adult child, mother, and father) and the 
relationships among them. The results will contribute to the discussion surrounding financial 
socialization practices, which will help ensure that future generations make responsible and 
healthy economic decisions. 
 In sum, my dissertation represents practical, novel research in a substantive domain: 
CFDM. Using multiple methods and diverse samples, I investigate how chronic spending habits 
foster initial attraction (Essay 1) and how existing relationships influence debt repayment 
decisions (Essay 2). The findings are aimed at a broad, interdisciplinary audience, as interest in 
the interplay between money and relationships is stronger now than ever before. I hope and 
expect that my work will offer guidance to consumers as they navigate consequential financial 
and personal decisions.
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Lack of consistent moderation by participant gender across experiments  
(Chapter 2) 
 
 
Experiment Primary effect Interaction with gender 
 
1: Dating game 
 
Saver vs. spender (p < .05) 
 
p = .572 
 
2A: MPC 
 
Saver vs. spender (p < .01) 
 
p = .044 
 
2B: Nine different labels 
 
Four saver vs. four spender 
conditions (p < .01) 
 
p = .014 
 
3A: Materialism 
 
Saver vs. spender (p < .01) 
 
p = .031 
 
3B: Financial viability 
 
Saver vs. spender (p < .01) 
 
p = .497 
 
4: Physical attraction 
 
Saver vs. spender (p < .05) 
 
p = .131 
 
5: Relationship seriousness 
 
Saver vs. spender (p < .01) 
 
p = .382 
 
6: Boredom susceptibility 
 
Saver vs. spender (p < .01) 
 
p = .180 
   
 
Note: While females were more sensitive to the saver versus spender label in experiment 2A 
(i.e., they found the saver significantly more desirable than the spender), males were more 
sensitive to the label in experiments 2B and 3A. 
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Table 2 
The interest rate and initial size of each account in the debt management game  
(Chapter 3) 
 
 
Debt Annual Interest Rate Initial Size 
 
Debt 1 
 
 
2.50% 
 
$3,000 
Debt 2 
 
2.00% $8,000 
Debt 3 
 
3.50% $11,000 
Debt 4 
 
3.25% $13,000 
Debt 5 
 
3.75% $52,000 
Debt 6 4.00% $60,000 
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Table 3 
Summary of multiple regression analyses examining the influence of partners’ financial 
confidence and financial literacy on debt game performance 
(Experiment 1, Chapter 3) 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B B SE t B B SE t B B SE t 
          
High FC partner               
(time 2) 
 
-2883 1465 1.97
†
    -3569 1420 2.51* 
Low FC partner               
(time 2) 
 
-954 1204 .79    130 1266 .10 
High FL partner                   
(time 2) 
 
   -459 1066 .43 -375 954 .39 
Low FL partner                  
(time 2) 
  -737 583 1.26 -757 503 1.51 
          
 
Note: FC stands for Financial Confidence and FL stands for Financial Literacy (Fernandes et al. 
2014). All three models were conducted among 24 couples who completed the debt management 
game together at time 1. FC and FL measures were taken at time 2, 10 months later. 
 
†
p ≤ .10 
* p ≤ .05 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
 
Mean attractiveness rating of the target as a function of his or her spending habits 
(Experiment 2B, Chapter 2) 
 
 
 
Note: The dashed line indicates the mean attractiveness rating in the Control condition. Error 
bars represent one standard error above and below the mean. 
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Figure 2 
The mediating role of anticipated financial viability and general self-control                                   
in the effect of spending habits on romantic attractiveness 
(Experiment 3B, Chapter 2) 
 
 
 
Note: Parallel mediation model featuring unstandardized coefficients. In the regressions, 
spending habits were contrast coded (saver = +.5, spender = –.5). The coefficient in parentheses 
(c’) represents the direct effect of spending habits on attractiveness, controlling for indirect 
effects. 
 
*p ≤ .01 
**p ≤ .001 
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Figure 3 
Mean attractiveness rating of the target as a function of his or her spending habits  
and relationship seriousness  
(Experiment 5, Chapter 2) 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent one standard error above and below the mean. 
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Figure 4 
Mean attractiveness rating of the target as a function of his or her spending habits  
and participants’ chronic boredom susceptibility 
(BSS Scores; Experiment 6, Chapter 2) 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent one standard error above and below the mean. 
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Figure 5 
Final screen of the debt management game for a financially optimal player  
(Chapter 3) 
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Figure 6 
Final screen of the debt management game for a debt-account-averse player  
(Chapter 3) 
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Figure 7 
Variability in debt repayment strategies across rounds 1-9 
 (Experiments 1 and 2, Chapter 3) 
 
         
  (A) Experiment 1 results                                       (B) Experiment 2 results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Debt 6 (D6) is the highest APR account in the debt game. Financially optimal players will close D6 in Round 10 (R10). 
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Figure 8 
The mediating role of inaccuracy perceptions in the effect of financial familiarity                        
on debt game performance 
(Experiment 3, Chapter 3) 
 
 
Note: Indirect-only mediation model featuring unstandardized coefficients. In the regressions, 
trivia condition was contrast coded (financial familiarity = +.5, control = –.5). The coefficient in 
parentheses (c’) represents the direct effect of trivia condition on final total debt, controlling for 
the indirect effect of inaccuracy perceptions. 
 
*p ≤ .05 
**p ≤ .01 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
 
Dating game simulation questions  
(Experiment 1, Chapter 2) 
 
 
Participant’s question               
for contestants 
Contestant 1’s response Contestant 2’s response 
 
What profession or job would 
you absolutely NOT like to be 
involved with? 
 
Politics 
 
Paparazzi 
 
What is your favorite book 
from childhood? 
 
Goodnight Moon 
 
The Cat in the Hat 
 
What sound or noise do you 
love? 
 
Laughter 
 
Rain 
 
What is your favorite meal of 
the day? 
 
There’s nothing like a 
good lunch. 
 
I actually love breakfast. 
 
When it comes to money, 
would you say you’re more of 
a saver or more of a spender?* 
 
More of a spender. 
 
More of a saver. 
   
 
Note: The roles of Contestant 1 and Contestant 2 in the final spending habits question were 
counterbalanced across experimental sessions. 
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Appendix 2 
Profile images of prospective mates  
(Experiments 2A-6, Chapter 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Target Female (Andrea)                     Target Male (Andrew) 
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Appendix 3 
A demonstration of the detectability of savers  
(Chapter 2) 
 
Experiments 2A-6 utilized an online dating paradigm where a target characterized him- 
or herself as a spender or a saver. However, when potential mates encounter one another in 
person, whether each person is a spender or a saver may not come up during casual conversation. 
Arguably, our experimental results are only relevant to these contexts if people can easily 
distinguish spenders from savers. Thus, we examined people’s ability to identify spenders and 
savers in a face-to-face setting, based on appearance alone.   
One’s tendency to save or spend may physically manifest itself in a number of ways (e.g., 
through clothing choices and accessories). Prior work suggests that snap judgments (or “zero-
acquaintance” judgments) of traits such as extraversion, conscientiousness, and intelligence are 
generally accurate (i.e., they correlate significantly with self-reported or measured values of the 
focal trait; Borkenau and Liebler 1993; Watson 1989). Here, we extend this line of work by 
examining the accuracy of snap judgments of saving and spending tendencies.  
 One hundred thirty-eight undergraduates (35% female) at a large Midwestern university 
participated in the study in exchange for course credit. Participants arrived at the lab in groups of 
6-10, and were seated around a large table. A tent card, displaying the participant’s laboratory ID 
number, was placed in front of each participant.  
 We initially measured participants’ self-reported spending or saving tendencies. 
Specifically, we asked participants to privately complete a “Getting to Know You” 
questionnaire, which asked, “In terms of money habits, would you say you’re generally more of 
a saver or a spender?” Participants could select either “I’m generally more of a saver” or “I’m 
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generally more of a spender.” (Consistent with our conceptualization of the saver/spender 
distinction as capturing differences in MPC, a pretest of this item among 120 adults revealed that 
self-identified savers intended to save a larger proportion of a hypothetical windfall than self-
identified spenders, p = .001. Self-identified savers also reported significantly greater savings 
and less credit card debt than self-identified spenders, ps ≤ .05.) The questionnaire also included 
filler items to mask its purpose (e.g., “Name your five favorite movies”). Overall, 56% of 
participants indicated that they were a saver, and 44% indicated that they were a spender. These 
proportions did not differ significantly by gender (58% of males and 50% of females reported 
that they were a saver; χ2(1) < 1).  
 We collected participants’ questionnaires, and then informed them that they would now 
be asked to guess every other participant’s spending versus saving habits. Participants were 
given a form that listed the ID numbers of the other participants, and were asked to guess 
whether each participant was a saver or a spender. We also asked participants to indicate whether 
or not they knew each participant before coming to the lab. (Based on recent participation trends, 
we anticipated that the sessions would be predominantly male, and thus we chose not to add a 
question exploring how attractive participants found one another.) We told participants that they 
could not talk or attempt to communicate in any way during the task, and everyone complied 
with these instructions. We informed participants that their guesses would remain confidential 
and would not be revealed to other participants. To ensure engagement in the task, we told 
participants that we would pay them $1 for each correct guess (i.e., for each guess that matched 
the participant’s self-reported spending or saving habits). After participants finished guessing 
everyone else’s spending or saving habits and handed in their form, they were asked to reveal 
their own self-reported spending or saving habits one-by-one to the group. At the end of the 
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study, we scored participants’ guesses and then paid them based on their performance. Total 
earnings ranged from $1 to $8 (mean: $4.59).  
 To examine the accuracy of snap judgments (“observers” judging “targets”), we 
correlated observers’ averaged ratings (each “saver” guess was coded as 1, each “spender” guess 
was coded as 0) of each target with the target’s self-report (“saver” report was coded as 1, 
“spender” report was coded as 0), an approach consistent with prior research (e.g., Vazire et al. 
2008). The results of this analysis revealed a significant, positive relationship (r(136) = .32, p < 
.001). Only 92 judgments (out of 1,073 total) were made by observers who indicated that they 
knew the target (who also indicated that they knew the observer). Naturally, this correlation is 
higher if we focus only on those 92 judgments (r(62) = .47, p < .001). (Sometimes multiple 
observers knew the same target, and thus of these 92 judgments, only 64 targets were judged, 
which is why the df was 62 in this analysis.) If we exclude these 92 judgments, the overall 
correlation remains significant (r(136) = .30, p < .001). 
We also specifically analyzed opposite-sex judgments (female observers judging male 
targets, and male observers judging female targets), which are particularly relevant to 
heterosexual romantic relationships. The correlation between observers’ averaged ratings and 
each target’s self-report remained significant when focusing specifically on opposite-sex 
judgments (r(119) = .20, p = .027). (The df was smaller in the opposite-sex analysis because two 
sessions were entirely male.) To put these correlations in perspective, prior work has 
demonstrated that snap judgments of extraversion (the most accurately judged of the Big 5 
personality factors) based on silent video clips consistently falls in the .20-.30 range (Borkenau 
and Liebler 1993; Yeagley, Morling, and Nelson 2007). Thus, snap judgments of saving versus 
spending tendencies appear to display considerable accuracy.   
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Appendix 4 
 
Trivia questions  
(Experiment 3, Chapter 3) 
 
 
 
Question set 1: University of Michigan trivia 
 
 
Answer options 
 
1. The University of Michigan was founded in Detroit in 
1817. In what year did it move to Ann Arbor? Note that 
in the same year, Michigan gained statehood. 
 
 
a. 1831, b. 1837, c. 1845, d. 1854 
2. What residence hall was built on the site of the former 
Frieze building? It cost $170 million to build and 
features the latest technology. 
 
a. North Quad, b. Fletcher Hall,                                 
c. South Quad, d. Henderson House 
3. What is the seating capacity of Michigan Stadium? 
 
a. 104,603, b. 105,121, c. 108,438, d. 109,901 
4. Which alumnus, Class of 1934, was a member of the 
football team during two undefeated seasons and went 
on to become President of the United States? 
 
a. Lyndon Johnson, b. Richard Nixon,                       
c. Gerald Ford, d. Jimmy Carter 
5. The Board of Regents governs the University. How 
many Regents are there? 
a. 8, b. 7, c. 6, d. 5 
  
 
Question set 2: Financial literacy trivia (part A) 
 
 
Answer options 
 
1. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account 
was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 
year, would you be able to buy: 
 
a. More than today with the money in this 
account, b. Exactly the same as today with the 
money in this account, c. Less than today with 
the money in this account, d. Don’t know 
 
2. Do you think that the following statement is true or 
false? “Bonds are normally riskier than stocks.” 
 
a. True, b. False, c. Don’t know 
 
3. Considering a long time period (for example, 10 or 20 
years), which asset described below normally gives the 
highest return? 
 
a. Savings account, b. Stocks, c. Bonds,                       
d. Don’t know 
 
4. When an investor spreads his or her money among 
different assets, does the risk of losing a lot of money: 
 
a. Increase, b. Decrease, c. Stay the same,                      
d. Don’t’ know 
 
5. Do you think that the following statement is true or 
false? “If you were to invest $1,000 in a stock mutual 
fund, it would be possible to have less than $1,000 when 
you withdraw your money.” 
 
a. True, b. False, c. Don’t know 
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Question set 3: Financial literacy trivia (part B) 
 
 
Answer options 
 
1. Do you think that the following statement is true or 
false? “After age 70 1/2, you have to withdraw at least 
some money from your 401(k) plan or IRA.” 
 
a. True, b. False, c. It depends on the type of 
IRA and/or 401(k) plan, d. Don’t know 
 
2. Suppose you have $100 in a savings account and the 
interest rate is 20% per year and you never withdraw 
money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much 
would you have in this account in total? 
 
a. More than $200, b. Exactly $200,                                   
c. Less than $200, d. Don’t know 
 
3. Which of the following statements is correct? 
 
a. Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot 
withdraw money in the first year, b. Mutual 
funds can invest in several assets, for example 
invest in both stocks and bonds, c. Mutual 
funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which 
depends on their past performance, d. None of 
the above, e. Don’t know 
 
4. Which of the following statements is correct? If 
somebody buys a bond of firm B: 
a. S/he owns a part of firm B, b. S/he has lent 
money to firm B, c. S/he is liable for firm B’s 
debts, d. None of the above, e. Don’t know 
 
5. Suppose you owe $3,000 on your credit card. You 
pay a minimum payment of $30 each month. At an 
annual percentage rate of 12% (or 1% per month), how 
many years would it take to eliminate your credit card 
debt if you made no additional new charges? 
 
a. Less than 5 years, b. Between 5 and 10 years, 
c. Between 10 and 15 years, d. Never, e. Don’t 
know 
 
Note: The correct answers are in boldface. The financial literacy trivia are items adapted from 
Fernandes et al. (2014). 
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